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LIABILITY FOR POSSIBLE WRONGS: 
CAUSATION, STATISTICAL PROBABILITY, 
AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF† 
Richard W. Wright 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Courts around the world are increasingly considering whether 
liability should exist in various types of situations in which a plaintiff 
can prove that a defendant’s tortious conduct may have contributed 
to the plaintiff’s injury, but it is inherently impossible, given the 
nature of the situation, for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s 
tortious conduct actually contributed to the injury.1 
Some courts and scholars in these types of situations have 
sought to treat increasing the risk of some harm as causation of the 
harm, but this clearly is fallacious.2  Other courts and scholars, 
including myself in my early articles, have sought to treat the 
defendant’s exposing the plaintiff to the risk of suffering an injury 
that subsequently occurred as itself being a legally cognizable 
injury.3  However, at an informal discussion hosted by Jules Coleman 
 
           †  © 2008 Richard W. Wright.  All rights reserved.  Permission is hereby granted to copy 
for noncommercial use as long as appropriate citation is made to this publication. 
             Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. 
 1. E.g., Accident Comp. Corp. v. Ambros, [2008] N.Z.L.R. 340 (C.A.); Barker v. Corus 
UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); Gregg v. Scott, 
[2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 A.C. 176 (U.K.); LARA KHOURY, UNCERTAIN CAUSATION IN 
MEDICAL LIABILITY 13–16 (2006); Vaughan Black & David Cheifetz, Through the Looking 
Glass Darkly: Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 241, 241 (2007); Ewoud Hondius, A 
Dutch DES Case: Pharmaceutical Producers Jointly and Severally Liable, 2 EUR. REV. PRIVATE 
L. 409, 409 (1994); Federico Stella, Causation in Products Liability and Exposure to Toxic 
Substances: A European View, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 403, 405–08, 411–15 (M. Stuart 
Madden ed., 2005). 
 2. See Stella, supra note 1, at 405–08, 411–15; Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. 
Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 439 (1985) 
[hereinafter Wright, Probabilistic Linkage]; Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, 
Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 
73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1042–67 (1988) [hereinafter Wright, Bramble Bush]. 
 3. Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 2, at 1067–77; Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort 
Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1813-21 (1985) [hereinafter Wright, Causation]. 
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at Yale Law School in 1990, I was quickly convinced by the other 
persons present that treating risk exposure, even as so qualified, as a 
legal injury to the individual plaintiff is wrong.4  Risks are merely 
abstract ex ante statistics that report the frequency of occurrence of 
some harm given a specified set of conditions.5  Unlike the actual 
occurrence of such harm, risks per se do not constitute an actual 
setback to another’s equal external freedom through an invasion of 
the other’s rights in his person or property, as is required for an 
interactive justice wrong.6  Treating the risk exposure as the legal 
injury, but only when the risked harm actually occurs and only in the 
problematic causation situations, is an ad hoc solution that, among 
other problems, fails to explain why recovery is contingent on the 
actual occurrence of the risked harm and why the damages are based 
on the ex post actual harm rather than the ex ante expected harm.7 
Liability in the problematic causation cases must be justified, if 
it can be, through the alternative approach that I identified and 
mistakenly rejected in my initial articles.  This approach begins by 
noting the distinction between the substantive requirements for 
liability and the evidentiary and procedural rules governing proof of 
those substantive requirements and then sets forth a principled 
justification for modifying the usual evidentiary and procedural rules 
when doing so is necessary to promote justice and avoid injustice.8  
 
 4. For subsequently published criticisms of my initial position by most of those who were 
present, see JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 399–401 (1992); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE 
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 156–58 (1995); Stephen R. Perry, Protected Interests and Undertakings 
in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247, 252–62 (1992). 
 5. Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 2, at 1046–54. 
 6. Id. at 1004; Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of 
Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214, 222–23 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); 
Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT 
LAW 159, 180 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal 
Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425, 1429–34 (2003) [hereinafter Wright, Legal 
Responsibility].  I use “interactive justice” to refer to what is commonly called “corrective 
justice” since “interactive,” unlike “corrective,” indicates the distinct focus of this division of 
justice and does not promote the common but erroneous assumption (e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 
4, at 348–49) that this type of justice is only concerned with redressing independently defined 
wrongs after they have occurred, and not with elaborating the nature of the wrong or, if possible, 
preventing its occurrence. 
 7. Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 405 (Tex. 1993); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 
2005). 
 8. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1812–13.  Although my change of position has 
been noted in my course materials since 1990, I have only recently had occasion to refer to it, 
briefly, in my published writings.  See Richard W. Wright, Acts and Omissions as Positive and 
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This is the approach that generally has been taken by scholars who 
view tort liability as being based on interactive justice.9  It is also the 
approach taken in a recent article by Mark Geistfeld,10 who, although 
he is primarily an efficiency theorist, seeks to reconcile efficiency 
arguments with arguments of fairness or justice.11  Geistfeld notes, 
correctly, that the courts view the causation requirement as a 
fundamental principle of tort liability, which, however, cannot be 
explained or justified by principles of efficient deterrence.12  He 
attempts to explain and justify, from a fairness perspective, a few of 
the tort doctrines developed to deal with some of the problematic 
causation situations.  Since his arguments raise and illustrate some of 
the major issues that I want to address, I devote considerable space to 
them below. 
The problematic nature of the causal issue is usually recognized 
when the probability of causation is not greater than 50 percent, with 
courts adopting different views, depending on the type of situation, 
on whether liability nevertheless is appropriate and, if so, whether 
liability should be full or only proportionate to the probability of 
causation.  However, when the probability of causation is only 
slightly higher—greater than 50 percent—many courts do not view 
either causation or liability as being problematic.  Indeed, under the 
commonly accepted version of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, liability 
 
Negative Causes, in EMERGING ISSUES IN TORT LAW 287, 301–02 (Jason W. Neyers et al. eds., 
2007) [hereinafter Wright, Acts and Omissions]; Richard W. Wright, Once More Into the 
Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1071, 1118 & n.163 (2001) [hereinafter Wright, Once More]. 
 9. See COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 395–99; WEINRIB, supra note 4, at 154–55; John C.P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Concern for Cause: A Comment on the Twerski-Sebok Plan 
for Administering Negligent Marketing Claims Against Gun Manufacturers, 32 CONN. L. REV. 
1411, 1420 n.25 (2000); Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 216–17, 233–43. 
 10. Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-Share 
Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447, 449–52, 457 (2006). 
 11. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Economics, Moral Philosophy, and the Positive Analysis of 
Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 6, at 250; Mark Geistfeld, 
Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 114 (2001).  However, Geistfeld’s conception of fairness and justice focuses 
on a utilitarian equal treatment or weighting of interests rather than on interactive justice.  See 
Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 461–62; Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort 
Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1025–26, 1030–32 (2001); infra note 58, and text accompanying 
notes 57–59. 
 12. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 449–52, 457; see Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1759–
74, 1813–28; Wright, Probabilistic Linkage, supra note 2, passim; Richard W. Wright, The 
Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility: Unscientific Formalism and False Semantics, 
63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553, passim (1987). 
  
1298 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1295 
is assumed to be unproblematic even though the only indication of 
negligent conduct as well as causation is a mere 50+ percent ex ante 
statistical probability. 
The dramatic difference in treatment of situations that are 
identical except for a trivial difference in statistical probability is due 
to an unexamined assumption that the usual “preponderance of the 
evidence” or “balance of probabilities” burden of persuasion in civil 
cases merely requires proof of a 50+ percent statistical probability.  
As will be demonstrated below, this assumption, which is common 
among academics as well as courts but is rejected by courts when the 
statistical rather than case-specific nature of the probability is 
obvious, has led to inconsistent and incoherent treatment of 
normatively and descriptively analogous types of situations and even 
to erroneous denials of proof of causation and liability in some 
situations in which tortious causation clearly exists. 
The statistical probability interpretation of the burden of 
persuasion in civil cases is inconsistent with the traditional 
understanding of that burden, which instead requires the formation of 
a minimal degree of belief, based on evidence specific to the 
particular occasion, in the actual existence of the disputed fact in the 
particular situation.  When the disputed fact is actual causation of 
injury, there must be a minimal belief that the causal law underlying 
the allegedly applicable causal generalization was fully instantiated 
on the particular occasion.  General statistics cannot support such a 
belief; only concrete evidence specific to the particular situation can 
do so. 
Only when the burden of persuasion is correctly understood can 
many currently debated issues regarding the existence and scope of 
tort liability be properly understood and consistently resolved.  When 
it is impossible to prove tortious causation, there may well be good 
reasons, as a matter of justice, for second-best solutions that impose 
full or proportionate liability on a defendant who behaved tortiously 
and whose tortious conduct may well have caused the plaintiff’s 
injury.  However, well-founded and consistent decisions on such 
matters will be reached only when there is a clear recognition of 
those situations in which a first-best solution is not possible due to 
the problematic nature of the causation issue.  When the various 
types of problematic situations are compared, it turns out that the 
market share liability principles adopted in Sindell v. Abbott 
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Laboratories13 and, arguably, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,14 which 
are highly controversial,15 are more defensible than the liability 
principles that are widely employed in the alternative causation 
cases,16 the medical malpractice lost-chance cases,17 the toxic tort 
cases,18 and, especially, in the usual formulation of the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine.19 
II.  ALTERNATIVE CAUSATION 
The widely adopted alternative causation doctrine, which is 
often misleadingly described as an “alternative liability” doctrine, 
allows a plaintiff who proves that his injury was tortiously caused by 
one or more of a (limited) group of tortious actors, but who is unable 
due to the nature of the situation to identify which particular actor(s) 
tortiously caused the injury, to hold each tortious actor who possibly 
caused the injury jointly and severally liable for the entire harm.20  
The leading American case is Summers v. Tice,21 in which the 
plaintiff’s eye was injured by a shotgun pellet that could have come 
from either of the negligent defendants’ guns.  The Summers court 
stated: 
When we consider the relative position of the parties and 
the results that would flow if plaintiff was required to pin 
the injury on one of the defendants only, a requirement that 
the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants 
becomes manifest.  They are both wrongdoers—both 
negligent toward plaintiff.  They brought about a situation 
where the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff, 
hence it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he 
can.  The injured party has been placed by defendants in the 
unfair position of pointing to which defendant caused the 
 
 13. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
 14. 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989). 
 15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28(b) cmt. o & 
cmt. o, reporters’ note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); see infra Part V. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Part VI. 
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28(b) & cmt. e 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965). 
 21. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). 
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harm.  If one can escape the other may also and plaintiff is 
remediless.22  
The Summers court notes that this rationale for shifting the 
burden of proof also supports the similar shift of the burden of proof 
when two or more defendants tortiously contribute to injuries that 
theoretically are or may be separable into different injuries caused by 
the different defendants but it is practically impossible for the 
plaintiff to prove which injuries were caused by which defendants: 
[T]he same reasons of policy and justice [that] shift the 
burden to each of defendants to absolve himself if he can 
―relieving the wronged person of the duty of apportioning 
the injury to a particular defendant, apply here where we 
are concerned with whether plaintiff is required to supply 
evidence for the apportionment of damages.  If defendants 
are independent tort feasors and thus each liable for the 
damage caused by him alone, and, at least, where the matter 
of apportionment is incapable of proof, the innocent 
wronged party should not be deprived of his right to 
redress.  The wrongdoers should be left to work out 
between themselves any apportionment.23 
In both types of cases, the shift of the burden of proof on the 
causation issue to the defendants is warranted as an implementation 
of interactive justice.  The plaintiff has established that he suffered 
an interactive justice wrong (a harm to his person or property caused 
by the wrongful conduct of another), that each of the defendants 
acted wrongfully toward him, and that the wrongful conduct of each 
defendant may have been the cause of the wrong.  When the plaintiff 
has proved this and it is practically impossible for him to prove 
which wrongfully acting defendant caused the wrong, justice is better 
served and injustice avoided, as both Summers and the Restatement 
 
 22. Id. at 4.  The court adds, “Ordinarily defendants are in a far better position to offer 
evidence to determine which one caused the injury,” id., but this is merely a supplementary rather 
than a determinative reason for shifting the burden of proof on (lack of) causation to the 
defendants, since it was neither required nor found to be true in Summers or in many other cases 
applying the doctrine. 
 23. Id. at 5; see Maddux v. Donaldson, 108 N.W.2d 33 (Mich. 1961); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28(b) & cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 
1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965). 
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(Second) state,24 by shifting the burden of proof on the causation 
issue to each wrongfully acting defendant, rather than leaving the 
wronged plaintiff without any remedy, at least when the number of 
defendants is not too large so that there is a substantial likelihood 
that each defendant was a cause of the wrong.25  Although a 
defendant in these types of situations often will have no better access 
to information about causation than the plaintiff and therefore will be 
unable to exculpate herself from being held fully liable under the 
joint and several liability doctrine, she will be able to bring 
contribution actions against the other possible wrongdoers, which, to 
the extent that the others are available and solvent, will result in an 
equitable sharing of the ultimate liability among the possible 
wrongdoers. 
In his recent article, Geistfeld occasionally mentions, but does 
not stress or rely on, the interactive justice rationale for the 
alternative causation doctrine, without so labeling it or 
acknowledging its elaboration in Summers or in the Restatement 
(Second).26  Instead, Geistfeld attempts to recast the alternative 
causation doctrine as a group causation doctrine by employing an 
“evidential grouping” principle, which contains two distinct but 
related parts.  First, to establish a prima facie case in situations in 
which it is inherently impossible for the plaintiff to prove which of 
several tortious actors caused the plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff need 
merely prove that the defendant was one of a group of defendants, 
each of whom behaved tortiously and may have tortiously caused the 
plaintiff’s injury and at least one of whom (unidentified) did 
tortiously cause the plaintiff’s injury.  Second, if the plaintiff 
establishes such an evidential group, the defendant can avoid liability 
only if she proves, as an affirmative defense, that it is not possible, 
rather than merely not probable, that she (tortiously) caused the 
plaintiff’s injury.27 
 
 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmts. d & f (1965); see infra text 
accompanying note 45. 
 25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. e (1965) (noting that, if there is a 
large number of actors, “each of whom contributes a relatively small and insignificant part to the 
total harm, . . . to hold each of them liable for the entire damage because he cannot show the 
amount of his contribution may perhaps be unjust”). 
 26. E.g., Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 471–72, 498. 
 27. Id. at 464–65, 466, 469.  Geistfeld also includes a requirement that “each defendant 
would be subject to liability for having actually caused or contributed to the harm,” id. at 469, 
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Geistfeld asserts that his evidential grouping principle does not 
result in any relaxation of the causation requirement, apparently 
because the plaintiff is still required to prove tortious causation of the 
injury by the usual preponderance standard, albeit by the evidential 
group as a whole rather than by the individual defendant.28  However, 
from the standpoint of the individual defendant, there clearly has 
been a substantial relaxation of the causation requirement: first, by 
merely requiring that the plaintiff prove causation by the evidential 
group of which the defendant is a member rather than by the 
defendant herself and, second, if the plaintiff does so, by shifting the 
burden to the defendant to prove that it is not possible, rather than 
merely not probable, that her tortious conduct was a cause.  The 
overall effect is a shift from requiring the plaintiff to prove tortious 
causation by the individual defendant by a preponderance of the 
evidence to requiring the implicated defendant to prove lack of 
causation by a virtual certainty. 
Geistfeld argues that his evidential grouping principle is 
supported by precedent and principle.  For precedents, he points to 
the multiple fires cases, in which two defendants independently and 
negligently start separate fires, each sufficient to destroy the 
plaintiff’s property, which merge and destroy the plaintiff’s property, 
and the successive injury cases in which the defendant tortiously 
injures the plaintiff, causing some disability, which however would 
have occurred subsequently due to a second injury separately caused 
by another defendant.29 
The courts hold both defendants liable for the destruction of the 
plaintiff’s property in the multiple fires cases (as described), and they 
hold the first but not the second defendant liable for the disability in 
 
which apparently is merely intended to preclude use of evidential grouping when one of the 
defendants is immune from suit rather than being an incorporation of attributable responsibility 
(“proximate” cause) requirements.  See id. at 469 & n.58, 493 n.126.  However, Geistfeld also 
discusses a “proximity” requirement, relating to how “direct” the possible connection between the 
defendant’s tortious conduct and the plaintiff’s harm must be.  He argues that the requirement of 
proof of a direct exposure to the defendant’s product in the asbestos cases, but not in the DES 
cases, “can be justified by evidential grouping” by the supposed fact that the DES manufacturers, 
unlike the asbestos manufacturers, were “acting in a practically indistinguishable manner,” even 
though he acknowledges that DES was produced and marketed in different shapes, sizes, colors, 
and dosages and with unique brand names.  Id. at 487–90 & n.116.  It was also, unlike asbestos, 
distributed through individual prescriptions with the identity of the manufacturer and the name of 
the recipient. 
 28. Id. at 447, 452–53, 458–59, 471, 479. 
 29. Id. at 462–63. 
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the successive injury case, although in neither case was either 
defendant a but-for cause of the relevant harm.  Geistfeld assumes 
that liability is being imposed through evidential grouping in the 
absence of proof of causation by the individual defendant(s).30 
This assumption is incorrect.  It is true that in these cases no 
defendant’s tortious conduct was a “but for” cause of the plaintiff’s 
harm.  However, it is generally recognized that the but-for test is an 
inadequate test of causation in such overdetermined causation 
situations, for which, instead, a sufficiency test must be used.  In the 
multiple fires cases, each fire was an actually sufficient condition 
and thus was a duplicative cause of the destruction of the plaintiff’s 
property.  In the successive injury case, only the injury inflicted by 
the first defendant was an actually sufficient condition for the 
plaintiff’s disability; the first injury preempted the potential disabling 
effect of the injury subsequently inflicted by the second defendant.31  
Contrary to Geistfeld’s claim, evidential grouping is not needed or 
employed in these cases.  The causal contribution of each defendant 
can be and is determined through a proper focus on the causal 
sufficiency rather than the causal necessity of each defendant’s 
tortious conduct—as Geistfeld acknowledges.32 
This is also true in the asbestos cases that Geistfeld discusses,33 
which the courts and the Restatement (Third) assume involve causal 
overdetermination rather than alternative causation.  They assume 
that, although no individual exposure may have been necessary or 
independently sufficient for the occurrence of the asbestos-caused 
disease, each exposure contributed to a cumulative threshold dosage 
 
 30. Id. at 462–64. 
 31. See Wright, Legal Responsibility, supra note 6, at 1440–42. 
 32. As Geistfeld acknowledges, a simple test of causal sufficiency is all that is needed to 
handle the multiple fires and successive injury cases, rather than the necessary element of a 
sufficient set (“NESS”) test that he describes as “hardly intuitive or easy to apply” and yet relies 
upon himself.  Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 465; see id. at 464 n.46, 469–70, 476 (noting that 
“evidential grouping” is not proper when individual causation can be resolved through the proper 
causal tests).  Geistfeld’s criticisms of the NESS test rely on David Fischer’s criticisms of the test, 
which confuse actual causation with “proximate” causation and ultimate responsibility.  Id. at 
465–66; see infra note 39, and accompanying text.  It is true that a different type of analysis is 
needed to handle the cases involving failures to use a defective safeguard and other 
overdetermined negative causation cases, since in such cases the issue is what caused the failure 
rather than the success of a causal process, but the analysis continues to be grounded in the 
concept of causation embodied in the NESS test.  Wright, Acts and Omissions, supra note 8, at 
302–07. 
 33. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 464, 468. 
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that is sufficient for the occurrence of the disease and thus is a cause 
of the disease.34  If this assumption is correct, the finding of causation 
is also correct, under the necessary element of a sufficient set 
(“NESS”) test of causation, and there is no need for evidential 
grouping.35  If, however, the “one-hit” theory of causation is true for 
asbestos or some other carcinogenic or toxic substance, no 
conclusion can be drawn regarding the causal status of any single 
exposure to that substance, or group of exposures that does not 
include all the exposures, and the cases are instead alternative 
causation cases like Summers but with a much greater number of 
alternative tortious causes.36  In such situations the courts refuse to 
hold the multiple defendants liable under the alternative causation 
doctrine.37 
Geistfeld apparently believes that the overdetermined causation 
cases exemplify his principle of evidential grouping because the 
courts will not allow a defendant to avoid liability in such cases by 
proving that the injury would have happened anyway as a result of 
the tortious conduct of one or more of the other possible tortfeasors, 
 
 34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 27 cmts. f, g, 28 
cmts. e, l,& cmt. g, reporters’ note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 35. Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 2, at 1018–22, 1035–39, 1073; Wright, Legal 
Responsibility, supra note 6, at 1443–45 & n.67.  Geistfeld cites Spaur v. Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Iowa 1994), as having explicitly adopted evidential 
grouping.  Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 459 n.34.  Spaur did quote and seemingly endorse Prosser 
and Keeton’s even broader form of such grouping, which would apply the but-for test to a group 
of defendants when none of them individually satisfies the but-for test.  510 N.W.2d at 858 
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 268 
(5th ed. 1984)).  However, not only is this broader form overinclusive, as Geistfeld concedes (see 
Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 458–59, 469–70), but it is meant to be applied only in the 
overdetermined causation cases, in which it is assumed that, although the defendant’s conduct 
was not a but-for cause or perhaps even an independently sufficient cause, it nevertheless 
contributed to the injury—as the NESS test would establish.  The Spaur court assumed, as have 
other courts dealing with asbestosis and mesothelioma, that multiple exposures to asbestos have a 
cumulative effect in causing those diseases, so each exposure is a concurring contributing cause.  
510 N.W.2d at 859, 861. 
 36. Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1218 (Cal. 1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 cmt. g, reporters’ note (Proposed Final Draft 
No. 1, 2005); Jane Stapleton, Two Causal Fictions at the Heart of U.S. Asbestos Doctrine, 122 
LAW Q. REV. 189 (2006); Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 2, at 1073. 
 37. Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1216–18; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmts. e, i, l & o (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  The Rutherford court 
held that, given the “irreducible uncertainty regarding the cellular formation of an asbestos-
related cancer,” a defendant could be held liable if the plaintiff proved that exposure to the 
defendant’s product(s) “in reasonable medical probability . . . was a substantial factor 
contributing to plaintiff’s or decedent’s risk of developing cancer.”  941 P.2d at 1220. 
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but rather require specific proof that the defendant was not a cause.38  
Geistfeld has been misled by David Fischer’s and Jane Stapleton’s 
failure to distinguish factual causation and attributable responsibility 
in the overdetermined causation cases.39  As explained above, in 
these cases the individual defendant’s tortious causation of the injury 
can be and has been proven, given the courts’ understanding of the 
causal processes involved, using a sufficiency rather than a necessity 
test of causation.  The defendant’s exculpatory argument is not an 
argument about lack of causation, but rather an attributable 
responsibility (“proximate” cause) argument that she should not be 
liable despite her tortious causation of the injury because it would 
have happened anyway as a result of the other defendants’ tortious 
conduct.  The courts properly reject this argument.  Consistent with 
interactive justice, they absolve the defendant of liability for the 
harm that she tortiously caused only if she proves, to a near certainty 
or at least by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a mere 
preponderance, that the harm would have occurred anyway as a 
result of a nonresponsible condition.40 
The Summers court does not rely upon a fiction of aggregate 
group causation, as Geistfeld does, nor does it say anything that 
would support the second part of Geistfeld’s evidential grouping 
principle, which raises the defendants’ burden of persuasion on lack 
of causation from a mere preponderance of the evidence to a virtual 
 
 38. See Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 463–65. 
 39. See id. at 463 n.42 (citing articles by Fischer and Stapleton); Wright, Acts and 
Omissions, supra note 8, at 296, 299–300 & n.36, 303–05 & n.47 (criticizing Fischer’s and 
Stapleton’s arguments); Wright, Once More, supra note 8, at 1115–31, 1116 n.156, 1121 n.172 
(also criticizing Fischer’s and Stapleton’s arguments). 
 40. Wright, Legal Responsibility, supra note 6, at 1434–67.  Geistfeld also quotes, as support 
for his evidential grouping principle, the court’s statement in Summers that “‘[We] believe it is 
clear that the [trial] court sufficiently found on the issue that defendants were jointly liable and 
that thus the negligence of both was the cause of the injury or to that legal effect.’”  Geistfeld, 
supra note 10, at 472 (quoting Summers v. Tice, 199 P. 2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948)) (emphasis by 
Geistfeld); see id. at 458 (same quote without italics).  As indicated by the qualifier, “or to that 
legal effect,” the Summers court was focusing on the normative legal responsibility issue rather 
than the causal issue.  Later in the same paragraph, the court states: 
[The trial court] determined that the negligence of both defendants was the legal cause 
of the injury—or that both were responsible.  Implicit in such finding is the 
assumption that the court was unable to ascertain whether the shots were from the gun 
of one defendant or the other or one shot from each of them.  The one shot that entered 
plaintiff’s eye was the major factor in assessing damages and that shot could not have 
come from the gun of both defendants.  It was from one or the other only. 
Summers, 199 P.2d at 3 (emphasis added). 
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certainty.  Instead, as we have seen, the Summers court focuses on 
the interactive justice implications of the elements that constitute the 
first part of Geistfeld’s principle, which, shorn of its aggregate 
causation pretensions, simply states the conditions that the Summers 
court elaborates as being sufficient, as a matter of interactive justice, 
for shifting the burden of proof (with the usual burden of persuasion) 
on the causation issue to the defendants.41 
Rather than focusing on the interactive justice argument that is 
emphasized by Summers and the Restatement (Second), Geistfeld 
argues that adoption of the alternative causation doctrine in Summers 
is justified by the fact that the two defendants “interacted to create 
impenetrable factual uncertainty regarding the identity of the shooter 
who actually hit the plaintiff, making the two defendants responsible 
for the uncertainty.”42  He subsequently extends this argument to 
justify applying the alternative causation doctrine when all the 
possible tortfeasors cannot be joined, since the joined defendants’ 
“misconduct has made it unreasonably difficult for the plaintiff to 
identify the actual tortfeasor.”43  Although he does not say so, this 
argument could be further extended to justify, contrary to the case 
law, applying the alternative causation doctrine when the possible 
alternative causes include nontortious conditions, even when there is 
only a single possible tortfeasor, since, as Geistfeld himself 
previously observed, tortious conduct “routinely creates factual 
uncertainty regarding causation.”44 
Geistfeld fails to note that the reference to factual uncertainty in 
the Restatement (Second) follows immediately after and completes 
the Restatement’s elaboration of the interactive justice rationale.  The 
Restatement (Second), like Summers, states that the reason for the 
shifted burden of proof is “the injustice of permitting proved 
wrongdoers, who among them have inflicted an injury upon the 
 
 41. See supra text accompanying notes 20–27. 
 42. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 476. 
 43. Id. at 478–79.  This argument is similar to Ariel Porat and Alex Stein’s “evidential 
damage” doctrine, which suffers from the same flaw of being applicable to any case in which 
there is any uncertainty about whether a defendant’s tortious conduct contributed to the plaintiff’s 
injury—which, as Geistfeld notes, is true of (almost?) every case.  See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX 
STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 160–84 (2001); Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, 
Indeterminate Causation and Apportionment of Damages: An Essay on Holtby, Allen, and 
Fairchild, 23 O.J.L.S. 667, 697–700 (2003). 
 44. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 456. 
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entirely innocent plaintiff, to escape liability because the nature of 
their conduct and the resulting harm has made it difficult or 
impossible to prove which of them has caused the harm.”45  The 
impossibility of proving causation in these types of situations is not 
by itself the rationale for shifting the burden of proof on the 
causation issue; rather, it completes the interactive justice rationale 
for doing so, which focuses on the proven wrong to the plaintiff, the 
defendants’ proven status as persons whose wrongful conduct may 
have caused that wrong to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s inability 
due to proof problems inherent in the type of situation to prove 
which wrongful actor actually caused him to suffer the wrong. 
Geistfeld initially states, correctly, that the “innocent plaintiff 
versus culpable defendant” rationale for the alternative causation 
doctrine, which is the primary rationale stated in the Restatement 
(Third),46 is similarly too broad; it would require that the burden of 
proof on the causation issue be shifted or otherwise relaxed 
whenever the plaintiff was not negligent, rather than only in those 
situations in which the alternative causation doctrine is applicable.47  
Yet, again, Geistfeld subsequently reverses ground.  He claims: 
Once the causal issue is evaluated in group terms, it . . . 
becomes apparent why the Restatement (Third) rationale for 
alternative liability . . . is applicable only to cases involving 
 
 45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. f (1965) (emphasis added); see id. cmt. 
d. 
 46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. f 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  The only other rationale mentioned in the Restatement 
(Third), as a supplemental rationale that might be at work in some cases, is defendants’ 
occasional better access to relevant evidence that is inaccessible to the plaintiff.  Id.  There was no 
such better access in Summers, and it is not a requirement for application of the doctrine.  Sindell 
v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 929–30 (Cal. 1980).  The “innocent plaintiff versus culpable 
defendant” argument was the principal, often sole, argument that was employed by plaintiffs’ 
advocates, almost always unsuccessfully, in the initial legislative debates over joint and several 
liability.  They should instead have pointed out the invalidity of the defense advocates’ argument 
that defendants were being held liable for injuries that they had not caused or for which they were 
not responsible.  Richard W. Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23 
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 45, 51–62 (1992). 
 47. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 456–57.  The Restatement (Third) does not disavow the 
“innocent plaintiff” rationale for relaxing the burden of proof in the single negligent actor 
situation.  It rather argues that there is no need to shift the burden of proof in that situation since 
there supposedly is substantial “flexibility” in inferring “more likely than not” causation when 
there is a single defendant, while such flexibility generally would be precluded by the 
mathematical odds in the alternative causation type of situation.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. f (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); see id. 
cmt. b. 
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multiple defendants and not a single defendant.  Insofar as 
alternative liability involves the grouping of defendants for 
causal purposes, it relies upon a principle that is not 
relevant to cases involving a single defendant.48 
This argument is circular and illogical.  Insofar as the “innocent 
plaintiff versus culpable defendant” rationale is used to justify 
treating the group as a single entity for causal purposes and shifting 
the burden of proof to the members of the group, it is circular to use 
the resulting grouping as a means of somehow limiting the use of the 
rationale in the single defendant context.  Moreover, insofar as the 
group is treated as a single entity, it is indistinguishable as a matter 
of principle from the single defendant situation. 
The “innocent plaintiff” rationale is at most a supplemental 
rationale that reinforces the interactive justice rationale, but which is 
not a necessary part of the interactive justice rationale and has no 
weight by itself.  References to the innocence of the plaintiff that 
appear in the Restatement (Second)’s rationale for shifting the burden 
of proof,49 and in some of the Summers court’s discussion but not in 
its justification for shifting the burden of proof,50 probably are simply 
due to the fact that a plaintiff’s contributory negligence was a 
complete defense when these statements were written, so any 
successful plaintiff would have had to be an innocent plaintiff.  As 
Geistfeld states, now that the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is no 
longer a complete defense, the alternative causation doctrine should 
be available to negligent as well as innocent plaintiffs.51  The 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence is an affirmative defense, which 
the defendant must prove, that is distinct from the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case against the defendant, for which the alternative causation 
doctrine and its interactive justice rationale—but not the supposed 
“innocent plaintiff” rationale—remain relevant and applicable. 
The Summers court shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to 
prove lack of causation, but it does not say or imply that the burden 
of persuasion the defendant must bear is changed from the usual 
preponderance standard.  In contrast, the second part of Geistfeld’s 
 
 48. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 475. 
 49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmts. d & f  (1965); see supra text 
accompanying note 45. 
 50. See supra text accompanying notes 22–23. 
 51. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 497–99. 
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evidential grouping principle allows an inculpated defendant to avoid 
liability only if she proves that it is not possible, rather than merely 
not probable, that her tortious conduct caused the injury.52 
Geistfeld includes this requirement to circumvent a critical but 
rarely noted problem that arises in the alternative causation cases 
when there are more than two defendants.  If a defendant is only 
required to prove lack of causation by the preponderance standard 
and—as Geistfeld and others assume—that standard merely requires 
a 50+ percent statistical probability, then the statistical probabilities 
by themselves ordinarily will enable each defendant to prove, 
without more, that she was not the cause of the injury.53  For 
example, if there are three defendants, each equally likely to have 
been the cause of the plaintiff’s injury, there is a 67 percent 
probability that any particular defendant was not the cause.  Contrary 
to the assumption of the Restatements and the holdings of the 
courts,54 a plaintiff could never successfully employ the alternative 
causation doctrine when there are more than two tortious actors 
whose tortious conduct may have caused the plaintiff’s injury. 
Geistfeld’s solution is to raise each defendant’s burden of 
persuasion on lack of causation from a mere preponderance of the 
evidence to a virtual certainty: the defendant must prove that she 
“could not possibly have caused the harm.”55  He justifies raising the 
burden of persuasion to this extremely high level by the logical 
inconsistency that otherwise would result.  Allowing each defendant 
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence interpreted as a 
statistical probability, that her tortious conduct was not a cause of the 
injury would result in proof that none of the actors’ tortious conduct 
was a cause, contrary to the plaintiff’s prior proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the tortious conduct of one of the 
actors was a cause.56 
 
 52. Id. at 465, 466. 
 53. Id. at 455. 
 54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28(b) & cmts. 
d(1) & e, reporters’ notes (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 433B(2)–(3) (1965). 
 55. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 465–466. 
 56. Id. at 464–65, 468.  Geistfeld sometimes recasts this argument as an assertion of an 
inconsistency between a defendant’s (assumed) admission that she may have caused the injury 
and her stating that more probably than not she did not cause the injury.  Id. at 466, 474.  This 
version of the argument has been employed by Arthur Ripstein and Benjamin Zipursky to support 
market-share liability in Sindell.  Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 234–35.  However, there 
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However, raising the defendant’s burden of persuasion does not 
eliminate the logical inconsistency that results from interpreting the 
preponderance standard as merely requiring a 50+ percent statistical 
probability; it rather papers over the logical inconsistency by 
requiring the defendants, but not the plaintiff, to prove the relevant 
issue by a virtual certainty—a standard that was not applied by the 
Summers court and that has not been applied by any other court in 
this context. 
Geistfeld supplements the logical inconsistency argument with a 
normative argument.  He argues that a failure to shift the burden of 
proof to the defendants and to raise each defendant’s burden of 
persuasion to a virtual certainty would be inconsistent with an 
alleged tort law norm of giving “equal weight or concern” to the 
interest of a nonculpable defendant in avoiding “false positives” 
regarding liability and the interest of a deserving plaintiff in avoiding 
“false negatives” by “apportion[ing] equally the burden of factual 
uncertainty or erroneous legal determinations between [them] . . . .”57  
He assumes that this alleged norm, which is based on the utilitarian 
conception of equality rather than the equal freedom principle that is 
the foundation of interactive justice,58 underlies the interpretation of 
the preponderance standard as a 50+ percent statistical probability.59  
However, the preponderance standard, even as so interpreted, 
obviously does not treat the defendant and plaintiff equally but rather 
displays more concern for nonculpable defendants than it does for 
deserving plaintiffs, by preferring the defendant over the plaintiff 
when the probabilities are equally balanced.  Moreover, it is not clear 
how allowing the plaintiff to prove tortious causation by the group of 
defendants (rather than by the individual defendant) by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but then requiring each defendant to 
prove lack of causation by a virtual certainty, gives equal weight and 
 
is no such admission in either Summers or Sindell and, even if there were, there is no 
inconsistency in admitting possible causation while denying proof of actual causation or liability. 
 57. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 461–62. 
 58. The erroneous identification of an equal weighting of interests—the fundamental 
premise of utilitarianism and economic efficiency—with the Kantian norm of “equal respect and 
concern” that underlies the concept of justice has been common not only among efficiency 
theorists but also among some proponents of interactive justice.  See Richard W. Wright, Justice 
and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JUR. 143, 167-94 (2002); Richard W. Wright, 
The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859, 1864–71 (2000). 
 59. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 461–62. 
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concern to the interest of each defendant as compared with the 
plaintiff. 
III.  THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD 
Geistfeld does not address the basic problem that gives rise to 
the apparent logical inconsistency in the alternative causation 
doctrine, which is brought into clear view when there are more than 
two possible tortfeasors.  That problem is the common but erroneous 
assumption that the preponderance standard merely requires a 50+ 
percent statistical probability.60 
Instead, without apparently realizing that he is doing so, 
Geistfeld contradicts the standard as so interpreted when he notes, 
correctly, that “‘[j]udges generally have refused to accept naked 
statistics or ex ante causal probabilities as evidence of what actually 
happened on a particular occasion’” and instead require 
“particularistic,” case-specific evidence of the actual existence on the 
particular occasion of the fact to be proved or disproved.61 
Similarly, as Geistfeld notes,62 when the reporters for the 
Restatement (Third) discuss alternative causation situations involving 
more than two defendants, they also depart from the statistical 
probability interpretation of the preponderance standard, which they 
otherwise accept,63 without advertising or perhaps realizing that they 
are doing so.  The reporters state: 
 
 60. Arthur Ripstein and Benjamin Zipursky also make this assumption, but unlike Geistfeld 
they therefore would not allow the alternative causation doctrine to be applied when there are 
more than two defendants.  Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 243.  They justify joint and 
several liability when there are only two defendants, despite the lack of proof that either 
defendant breached a duty of non-injury as required by their theory, on the ground that, since the 
probabilities of breach and non-breach are (supposedly) evenly balanced, the tie should be broken 
in favor of the plaintiff because doing so will result in only a 50 percent chance of the plaintiff’s 
proceeding against the defendant who did not cause his injury, while not doing so “is guaranteed 
to leave the loss with the innocent plaintiff, and to relieve the negligent tortfeasor of liability.”  Id. 
at 242.  This argument is incorrect.  Applying the alternative causation doctrine allows—indeed 
perhaps requires—the plaintiff to proceed against both defendants and to hold each potentially 
fully liable, and thus results in a 100 percent chance (guarantee) of the plaintiff’s proceeding 
against the defendant who did not cause his injury.  See infra text accompanying notes 102–105.  
The “injustices” are evenly balanced under their error-minimizing view of “justice.” 
 61. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 467–68 (quoting Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 2, at 
1050–51); see PORAT & STEIN, supra note 43, at 87, 89.  Portions of the following discussion are 
extracted from a much more extensive discussion in Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 2, at 
1048–77.  See also Stella, supra note 1, at 411–15, 417–20. 
 62. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 456 n.23, 474. 
 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 26 cmt. l & illus. 
5, n, 28 cmt. a, reporters’ note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
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Defendants would be able to satisfy their burden of 
production when three or more defendants are subject to 
alternative liability in one of two ways: a defendant might 
show why it was not the cause of plaintiff’s injury or it 
might show which one of the other defendants was the 
cause.64 
To show why she was not the cause or which one of the other 
defendants was the cause, the defendant must produce concrete 
particularistic evidence specific to the particular occasion, rather than 
mere abstract ex ante causal probabilities or noncausal “naked 
statistics,” neither of which provide any information about what 
actually happened on the particular occasion.  A judgment on what 
actually happened on a particular occasion is a judgment on which 
causal generalization and its underlying causal law was fully 
instantiated on the particular occasion.  An item of particularistic 
evidence is a concrete feature of a particular occasion that 
instantiates, or negates the instantiation of, one of the abstract 
elements in a possibly applicable causal generalization.  
Particularistic evidence connects a possibly applicable causal 
generalization to the particular occasion by instantiating the abstract 
elements in the causal generalization, thereby converting the abstract 
generalization into an instantiated generalization.  Without such 
particularistic evidence, there is no basis for applying the causal 
generalization to the particular occasion. 
An abstract ex ante causal probability associated with some 
possibly applicable causal generalization is not evidence of what 
 
 64. Id. § 28 cmt. j, reporters’ note at 565 (emphasis added).  See also Senn v. Merrell-Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 751 P.2d 215 (Or. 1988), in which the court, while apparently adopting the 
statistical probability interpretation of the preponderance standard—and thus noting that in 
alternative causation situations involving two defendants, “the evidence is in equipoise” so that, 
“[i]n theory, one of the defendants can escape liability altogether by presenting some scintilla of 
exculpatory evidence greater than that the other defendant produces”—stated that in situations 
involving more than two defendants “the necessary quantum of exculpatory evidence cannot be 
easily articulated,” despite noting that the probability of any defendant’s being the cause if there 
are three defendants is only 33 1/3 percent.  Id. at 223.  Indeed, the court in Senn did not allow 
either defendant to be held liable even though one of the defendants had 73 percent of the market 
for the drug in question.  Id. at 216 n.1; see infra text accompanying notes 132–135.  I am not 
aware of any alternative causation case in which a court held one defendant liable and the others 
not liable because the one defendant had a 50+ percent statistical probability of being the cause, 
although that would surely be the situation in many cases even when, as in Senn, there are only 
two defendants.  Consider Summers itself if one defendant was a better shooter, or if the shotgun 
cartridge for one defendant contained 340 pellets and the cartridge for the other contained only 
339. 
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actually happened on the particular occasion because it provides no 
information on whether the abstract elements in the causal 
generalization and the underlying causal law actually were 
instantiated on the particular occasion.  It merely states that X 
percent of the time that the known abstract elements in the causal 
generalization are instantiated, the unknown abstract elements 
required to complete the causal law are also instantiated.  It does not 
help us determine whether this particular occasion is one of the X 
percent in which the causal law was fully instantiated, or instead is 
one of the 100 – X percent in which the causal law was not fully 
instantiated.  If a horse wins 90 percent of its races or the odds are 90 
percent that a spin of a roulette wheel will not result in the ball’s 
landing on a certain number, no one who placed a bet either way in 
either situation will consider themselves to have won or lost the bet 
in the absence of particularistic evidence of the actual outcome of the 
particular race or spin of the wheel. 
Even less relevant are “naked statistics,” which are reports of 
accidental groupings that neither instantiate an abstract element in a 
possibly applicable causal generalization nor are ex ante causal 
probabilities associated with any such generalization—for example, 
the fact that over half of the taxis in a town are owned by a particular 
company.  When such naked statistics are presented to courts as 
alleged proof of causation, they are almost always rejected as having 
no relevance.65 
The preponderance of the evidence standard, properly 
interpreted, requires particularistic evidence rather than naked 
statistics or ex ante causal probabilities: 
It has been held not enough that mathematically the chances 
somewhat favor a proposition to be proved; for example, 
the fact that colored automobiles made in the current year 
outnumber black ones [a naked statistic] would not warrant 
a finding that an undescribed automobile of the current year 
is colored and not black, nor would the fact that only a 
 
 65. E.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359–60 (7th Cir. 1998); Smith v. 
Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. 1945); Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 2, at 
1050 n.271.  In the Howard case and again in United States v. Veysey, 334 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 
2003), quoted by Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 467 n.55, Judge Posner repeats the mathematical 
probabilists’ “missing evidence” argument to try to explain the courts’ rejection of naked 
statistics.  The flaws in that argument are discussed in Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 2, at 
1055–56. 
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minority of men die of cancer [an ex ante causal 
probability] warrant a finding that a particular man did not 
die of cancer.  The weight or ponderance of evidence is its 
power to convince the tribunal which has the determination 
of the fact, of the actual truth of the proposition to be 
proved.  After the evidence has been weighed, that 
proposition is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if 
it is made to appear more likely or probable in the sense 
that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, 
exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding 
any doubts that may still linger there.66 
To determine whether a specific causal law was fully 
instantiated, we use particularistic evidence to assess, non-
quantitatively, the ex post probability that each of the abstract 
elements in the causal law was instantiated.  The ex post probability 
for complete instantiation of the causal law is equal to the lowest ex 
post probability for instantiation of any constituent element.  The ex 
post probability for instantiation of the known abstract elements 
listed in the causal generalization is either based on direct 
particularistic evidence of such instantiation or, as with the unknown 
abstract elements required to complete the causal law, is 
circumstantially inferred from particularistic evidence of the network 
of causal relationships that encompasses the particular occasion.  The 
final judgment on what actually happened depends on whether the 
unquantified ex post probability associated with a possibly applicable 
causal generalization—the ex post probability, based on all the 
particularistic evidence, that the causal law underlying the causal 
generalization was fully instantiated—is sufficient, in comparison 
with the unquantified ex post probability associated with competing 
causal generalizations, to produce the required degree of belief in the 
truth that the first causal generalization and its underlying law were 
the ones that were fully instantiated on the particular occasion. 
In tort law, as in other areas of civil law, the required degree of 
belief generally is the attainment of the slightest degree of belief,67 
 
 66. Sargent v. Mass. Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass. 1940) (citations omitted). 
 67. See e.g., Livanovitch v. Livanovitch, 131 A. 799, 800 (Vt. 1926) (“If . . . you are more 
inclined to believe from the evidence that he did so deliver the bonds to the defendant, even 
though your belief is only the slightest degree greater than that he did not, your verdict should be 
for the plaintiff.” (quoting the trial court’s jury instructions)). 
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rather than the much stronger degrees of belief required under the 
“clear and convincing evidence,” “beyond a reasonable doubt,” or 
virtual certainty standards.  This is how the preponderance of the 
evidence standard traditionally has been understood and is presented 
to juries: 
To “establish by a preponderance of the evidence” means to 
prove that something is more likely so than not so.  In other 
words, a preponderance of the evidence in the case means 
such evidence as, when considered and compared with that 
opposed to it, has more convincing force, and produces in 
your minds belief that what is sought to be proved is more 
likely true than not true.  This rule does not, of course, 
require proof to an absolute certainty, since proof to an 
absolute certainty is seldom possible in any case.68 
Jury instructions often refer to the “weight” of the evidence.  
Only concrete particularistic evidence has “weight.”  The 
instructions generally refer to proof that the disputed fact is “more 
probably true than not true,” rather than simply “more likely than 
not” as a matter of abstract class-based statistics.69 When “more 
likely than not” or some similar phrase is employed, it is usually 
clear from the surrounding language that the phrase is not being used 
to refer to a mere statistical probability, but rather to refer to the truth 
of what actually happened on the particular occasion.  Empirical 
studies have found that few judges, jurors, or laypersons interpret the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard or even a “more probable 
than not” standard as merely requiring a 50+ percent statistical 
probability.  When asked to attach a quantitative probability to these 
phrases, many refuse to do so, and the great majority of those who do 
so specify a probability much higher than 50 percent.70 
 
 68. 3 EDWARD H. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 
72.01, at 32 (4th ed. 1987) (emphasis added); see also Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 2, at 
1065 & nn.337–39 (citing numerous sources). 
 69. E.g., ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, 
ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 21.01 (2006) (“more probably true than not 
true”) [hereinafter ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; 4 LEONARD SAND ET AL., MODERN 
FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ¶ 73.01, Instruction 73–2 (2007) (stating that “by a preponderance 
of the evidence” means “more likely true than not true,” considering the “weight” and “quality 
and persuasiveness” of the evidence). 
 70. When asked to do so by researchers, many judges explicitly object to interpreting 
burdens of proof in terms of quantitative probabilities.  C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: 
Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 
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When the preponderance standard and its various substitutes are 
properly understood as requiring the formation of a minimal belief in 
the truth of a disputed fact, based on particularistic evidence specific 
to the particular occasion, the logical inconsistency that results from 
using the statistical probability interpretation of the preponderance 
standard in the alternative causation cases disappears, and there is no 
need to require an inculpated defendant in an alternative causation 
situation to prove lack of causation to a virtual certainty rather than 
by the usual preponderance of the evidence.  As Geistfeld states: 
[T]he plaintiff has provided particularistic evidence 
showing that each defendant belongs to the group of 
[possible] tortfeasors that caused the harm, whereas each 
defendant [using the statistical probability argument] only 
relies upon “quantitative probability” or “the greater 
chance” that the other defendants caused the injury.  That 
evidence, however, is not probative of what actually 
happened on this particular occasion, since the evidence, 
when relied upon by each defendant, establishes that no one 
 
1332 (1982); Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the 
Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 319, 329 (1971) (quoting judges as 
stating that “[p]ercentages or probabilities simply cannot encompass all the factors, tangible and 
intangible, in determining guilt—evidence cannot be evaluated in such terms”).  In one survey, 80 
out of 255 judges refused to specify a probability sufficient for a “preponderance of the evidence” 
finding.  McCauliff, supra, at 1325 n.184, 1330.  Of the judges who were willing to do so, only 
about three-fifths chose a probability of 50 to 55 percent; about two-fifths chose a probability of 
60 percent or greater, almost one-fifth a probability of 70 percent or greater, one-tenth a 
probability of 80 percent or greater, and one-twentieth a probability of 90 to 100 percent.  Id. at 
1331; Simon & Mahan, supra, at 324–25, 327 tbl.7.  The distribution of probabilities was about 
the same for the more-probable-than-not standard.  McCauliff, supra, at 1331.  Laypersons—
jurors and students—were even less willing to interpret the preponderance standard as a mere 
greater-than-fifty-percent probability.  About four-fifths of the laypersons chose a probability of 
70 percent or greater, half a probability of 80 percent or greater, and more than one-tenth a 
probability of 95 to 100 percent.  Simon & Mahan, supra, at 327 tbl. 7; see also Dorothy K. 
Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 159, 164, 169 (1985) (discussing an empirical study demonstrating a divergence 
between subjects’ findings under the preponderance standard and a quantified 51 percent 
standard, with results closer to those obtained under the preponderance standard even when the 
two standards were combined in the same instruction).  Over 90 percent of the judges and about 
two-thirds of the laypersons were opposed to having jurors simply make a probability finding, 
which the judge would then use to determine liability.  Simon & Mahan, supra, at 329, 330 n.8.  
Trial consultants continue to advise plaintiffs’ lawyers that “[m]any jurors will not agree to 
decide on the basis of 80 percent or 70 percent or 60 percent certainty,” but rather “expect you to 
prove your case beyond a reasonable doubt, and you won’t change their minds by explaining 
preponderance.”  David Ball, Making Preponderance Work, TRIAL, Mar. 2008, at 38, 39.  
Instead, the trial consultants advise, repeatedly get witnesses to testify that something is “more 
likely right than wrong” and, “beyond that,” that they are “certain.”  Id. at 40. 
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caused the harm, and that outcome is inconsistent with the 
plaintiff’s uncontested particularistic proof that she was, in 
fact, injured by at least one of the defendants.  To avoid 
liability, a defendant must instead provide [particularistic] 
evidence rebutting the plaintiff’s particularized proof . . . .71 
IV.  INCREASED RISKS AND LOST CHANCES 
Although phrases such as “more likely than not” or “balance of 
probabilities” have long been part of the legal language regarding the 
burden of persuasion in tort law and other areas of civil law, it is 
only in fairly recent years that they have come to be understood as 
mere statistical probability statements.  A major locus of this shift in 
understanding is the toxic tort cases, in which proof often depends 
on, and often consists solely of, statistical epidemiological evidence.  
Such evidence is very useful, although neither necessary nor 
sufficient, in establishing that a toxic substance is capable of causing 
a particular kind of injury—the causal capacity or “general 
causation” issue.  However, such evidence has also incorrectly come 
to be viewed by many courts as being sufficient to prove the actual 
occurrence of the relevant causal process on a particular occasion— 
“specific causation”—if exposure to the substance (which has to be 
proved by particularistic evidence specific to the particular occasion) 
more than doubles the frequency of occurrence of that kind of injury, 
so that it can be said that, whenever that injury occurs, it “more 
likely than not” was due to the exposure to the toxic substance.72 
On the other hand, “numerous jurisdictions have rejected 
medical experts’ conclusions based upon a ‘probability,’ a 
‘likelihood,’ and an opinion that something is ‘more likely than not’ 
as insufficient medical proof,” and instead have required that the 
expert express a “reasonable medical certainty” about the fact at 
 
 71. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 468. 
 72. E.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1313–14, 1318–22 (9th Cir. 
1995); Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Md. 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 655 
(4th Cir. 1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. 
c(4) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  Geistfeld notes that the “doubling+” requirement is too 
stringent if exposure to the substance at issue accelerates or otherwise contributes to harms that 
would have occurred anyway absent such exposure.  Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and 
Causation in Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1033–35 (2001). 
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issue.73  Unfortunately, “reasonable certainty” standards are not 
employed and have no meaning in the medical and scientific 
communities, so the plaintiff’s attorney can and often does fill the 
semantic void, and the plaintiff’s expert then employs the required 
terminology.74 
If the expert opinion, whether couched in terms of “reasonable 
certainty,” “more likely than not,” or “preponderance of the 
evidence,” is based only on an aggregate statistical probability, a 
good defense attorney will make explicit the purely statistical nature 
of the evidence and ask the expert, “Can you say whether the 
plaintiff’s exposure to the [relevant substance] actually caused the 
[relevant specific harm] in this case?”  The expert—if honest—will 
reply, “No,” and be chagrined for having been made to appear to 
have contradicted her earlier testimony. 
As in the alternative causation cases, the statistical probability 
interpretation of the preponderance standard produces odd results in 
the toxic torts cases.  When exposure to a substance more than 
doubles the risk, the “doubling+” doctrine will result in defendants 
being held liable for every instance of the injury that occurs 
following exposure to the substance, even if there is no evidence that 
the substance actually caused the injury on any particular occasion, 
and even though exposure to the substance could only have caused a 
portion of the injuries.  For example, if exposure to the substance 
barely doubles the frequency of occurrence of the injury, so that just 
over half of the injuries that occur following exposure to the 
substance are caused by that exposure, defendants nevertheless will 
be held liable in every case, for all of the injuries.  Conversely, when, 
as is usually the case, exposure to the substance does not more than 
double the frequency of occurrence of the injury, no defendant will 
be liable for any of the injuries that occur following exposure to the 
substance, no matter how many may actually have been caused by 
such exposure, even though as many as half of the injuries may be 
due to exposure to the substance.75 
 
 73. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200–01 (6th Cir. 1988); see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. a (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. a & cmt. 
a, reporters’ note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 75. See id. § 28 cmt. c(4). 
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The “doubling+” standard of proof of specific causation in the 
toxic tort cases should be recognized for what it is: a departure from 
the usual tort and civil law rules regarding proof of causation, which 
provides either full recovery or (much more often) no recovery, 
depending on the arbitrary fact of whether exposure to the substance 
just barely doubles or just barely fails to double the overall frequency 
of occurrence of the injury.  When it is seen in its true light, rather 
than being mistakenly viewed as a straightforward application of the 
preponderance standard, the normative issue needs to be addressed: 
does the “doubling+” standard best promote justice in this context, or 
should there be a disallowance of any recovery absent specific proof 
of causation on the particular occasion even if exposure to the 
substance more than doubles the frequency of occurrence of the 
injury, or full or (more likely) partial recovery proportional to the 
probability of causation whether or not exposure to the substance 
more than doubles the frequency of occurrence of the injury? 
The same normative issue arises in the medical malpractice 
context, where, again, most courts recognize the issue only when the 
probability of causation is equal to or less than 50 percent.  Many 
courts erroneously assume that, if the doctor’s negligence in 
diagnosing or treating an ill patient deprived the patient of a 50+ 
percent statistical probability of avoiding the adverse health result 
that occurred—generally, death—then causation is easily established 
under the preponderance standard.76 
However, if the plaintiff would have had at most a 50 percent 
chance of survival with proper diagnosis and treatment, the 
normative issue is unavoidable even if it is not always explicitly 
acknowledged.  Many jurisdictions, focusing on the need to deter 
negligent treatment of patients with less than a 50+ percent chance of 
 
 76. See, e.g., Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l. Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 399–400 (Tex. 1993); cf. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1, 2005) (assuming proof of causation, and thus full liability, if “the probability of a 
better outcome was in excess of 50 percent”).  Rather than simply focusing on the initial 
probability of survival, the probability analysis should take into account the effect of the 
defendant’s negligence on the probability of death.  For example, if a plaintiff with proper 
diagnosis and treatment would have had a 70 percent statistical probability of surviving, which 
was reduced to 45 percent by a defendant’s negligent diagnosis or treatment, there was less than a 
doubling of the risk of death (55/30 = 1.83), and only a 45 percent statistical probability ((55 – 
30) / 55) that the death was caused by the defendant’s negligence.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. n, reporters’ note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 
2005); Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance 
Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG. 369, 393–99 (2005). 
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survival and the doctor’s breach of an affirmative obligation to take 
reasonable care to maximize the plaintiff’s chance, have fashioned 
doctrines to allow the plaintiff to hold the defendant liable.77  The 
initial decisions, and even some of the more recent ones, attempt to 
portray the liability as not being a departure from the usual proof of 
causation requirement.  These decisions use a “substantial factor” 
instruction to send the causal issue to the jury, which is allowed to 
find causation and impose full liability despite a less than 50+ 
percent probability of survival even with proper diagnosis and 
treatment.78  Some of the courts that employ this “relaxed causation” 
approach candidly admit that it “permits the jury to engage in some 
speculation with respect to cause and effect” and that juries, without 
being instructed to do so, “often discount damages according to the 
statistical evidence in order to accurately evaluate the true loss.”79  
Other courts employing the “relaxed causation” approach explicitly 
restrict recovery to an amount proportional to the lost chance or the 
probability of causation.80 
Many courts treat the lost chance as the legal injury (an 
approach I initially supported but no longer support),81 which enables 
the factfinder to make a fairly straightforward finding of the 
defendant’s having caused the loss of the chance and limits damages 
to the value of the lost chance.82 
Some of the courts that have adopted the “relaxed causation” 
approach, including the courts in Hicks v. United States83 and Hamil 
v. Bashline,84 the two leading cases that have been relied on by other 
courts,85 have done so in situations in which the plaintiff allegedly 
 
 77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. n & 
cmt. n, reporters’ note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 
178 (2000). 
 78. See, e.g., Holton v. Mem’l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1209–13 (Ill. 1997); Hamil v. 
Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1286–89 (Pa. 1978).  The Holton court noted that it had not been asked 
to treat the lost chance as a distinct, legally cognizable injury.  679 N.E. at 1210 n.1. 
 79. Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 615–16 (Ariz. 1984). 
 80. See, e.g., Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, 540–41 (Ind. 2000); McKellips v. Saint 
Francis Hosp., 741 P.2d 467, 475–77 (Okla. 1987). 
 81. See supra text accompanying notes 3–7. 
 82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. n & 
cmt. n, reporters’ note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); DOBBS, supra note 77, § 178. 
 83. 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966) (plaintiff “would have survived” with proper 
treatment). 
 84. 392 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. 1978) (75 percent probability of survival). 
 85. Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 2, at 1069. 
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had a much greater than 50 percent probability of survival that was 
totally eliminated by the defendant’s negligence.  They thus 
apparently reject the statistical probability interpretation of the 
preponderance standard, or else there would be no reason to discuss 
the need for a relaxed burden of proof of causation.  At the least, they 
recognize that a mere statistical probability, no matter how high, is 
insufficient to prove whether the defendant’s negligence caused the 
patient’s death in the particular case.  Some of the courts that treat 
the lost chance as a distinct legal injury also recognize this.86  In his 
influential plurality opinion in Herskovits v. Group Health 
Cooperative,87 which was the first judicial opinion to treat the lost 
chance as the legal injury, Justice Pearson criticized having all-or-
nothing liability that arbitrarily turns on the satisfaction of a 50+ 
percent statistical probability threshold: 
Under the all or nothing approach . . . a plaintiff who 
establishes that but for the defendant’s negligence the 
decedent had a 51 percent chance of survival may maintain 
an action for that death.  The defendant will be liable for all 
damages arising from the death, even though there was a 49 
percent chance it would have occurred despite his 
negligence.  On the other hand, a plaintiff who establishes 
that but for the defendant’s negligence the decedent had a 
49 percent chance of survival recovers nothing.88 
Just as the but-for test of actual causation “takes the eye off the 
ball” by asking what might have happened had things been different, 
rather than focusing attention on what actually did happen,89 the 
statistical probability interpretation of the preponderance standard 
takes the eye off the ball by asking what was likely to happen ex 
ante, or what the abstract statistical odds were, rather than focusing 
on what actually happened ex post.  Both forms of misperception 
infected the decision of the British House of Lords in Hotson v. East 
 
 86. E.g., DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986).  The plaintiff’s 50 to 80 
percent chance of ten-year survival of cancer was reduced to zero by the defendant doctor’s 
negligent diagnosis.  Id. at 135, 137.  The Iowa Supreme Court held that causation of a shortened 
life could not be established but that the plaintiff could recover for the reduced chance of a longer 
life.  Id. at 135, 137–38. 
 87. 664 P.2d 474, 479–87 (Wash. 1983) (plurality opinion). 
 88. Id. at 486. 
 89. See Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1803. 
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Berkshire Area Health Authority,90 which held that the defendant was 
not liable due to a lack of causation despite sufficient evidence of 
causation. 
The plaintiff in Hotson was a thirteen-year-old boy who fell 
from a tree while playing on a school ground.  The fall caused an 
acute traumatic fracture of the left femoral epiphysis and the rupture 
of some but not all of the blood vessels that supplied necessary blood 
to the epiphysis.91  The parties agreed that a group of blood vessels 
providing around 20 percent of the blood had been ruptured and that 
another group supplying somewhere under 30 percent had not been 
ruptured; they disagreed on whether a third group of blood vessels 
that provided around half of the blood had been ruptured.92  The 
defendant health authority negligently failed to diagnose the boy’s 
condition when he was brought into the hospital a few hours after the 
accident, which delayed proper diagnosis and treatment of the injury 
for five days.  During those five days, the plaintiff’s expert argued, 
the bleeding from the ruptured blood vessels caused swelling of the 
epiphysis that compressed the distorted but intact blood vessels and 
blocked the blood supply from those blood vessels.  The defendant’s 
expert opined that no swelling and compression had occurred.93  If 
there had been immediate treatment, no further damage to the blood 
supply would have occurred.94  As a result of inadequate blood 
supply, the epiphysis became distorted and deformed, resulting in 
permanent injury to the boy’s left hip and leg.95 
The trial judge stated that he was unable to accept either of the 
experts’ “competing extreme views.”96  He found that, even if the 
health authority had correctly diagnosed and treated the plaintiff 
when he first arrived at the hospital, there was a 75 percent 
probability that he would have suffered the same permanent injury, 
which by the time he was actually treated was virtually certain to 
occur due to the compression and blocking of the intact blood vessels 
 
 90. [1987] 1 A.C. 750 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
 91. Id. at 779 (Lord Bridge of Harwich). 
 92. Id. at 791 (Lord Ackner). 
 93. Id. at 779–81 (Lord Bridge of Harwich). 
 94. Id. at 785 (Lord Mackay of Clashfern). 
 95. Id. at 790–91 (Lord Ackner). 
 96. Id. at 781 (Lord Bridge of Harwich). 
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by the bleeding from the ruptured blood vessels.97  The House of 
Lords, focusing on the 75 percent probability that the permanent 
injury would have occurred in the absence of the defendant’s 
negligence, held that the defendant was not liable due to lack of 
causation, which as a past fact is determined by the “balance of 
probabilities”—the British version of the preponderance of the 
evidence burden of persuasion.98  Moreover, the court held, there 
could be no recovery for any lost chance: “In determining what did 
happen in the past a court decides on the balance of probabilities.  
Anything that is more probable than not it treats as certain.”99 
The judges’ myopic focus on the ex ante causal probabilities 
prevented them from paying careful attention to the evidence of what 
actually happened.  It does not matter, with respect to the issue of 
factual causation, that there was a 75 percent probability that the 
permanent injuries would have occurred anyway because insufficient 
blood vessels remained intact, and thus a 75 percent probability that 
the delay was not a but-for cause of the permanent injury.  The delay 
in treatment resulted in the preventable swelling of the epiphysis 
caused by bleeding from the ruptured blood vessels, which 
compressed and blocked the supply of blood from the intact blood 
vessels.  The delay in treatment thus contributed to (was a NESS 
cause of) the loss of blood that caused the distortion and deformation 
of the epiphysis and the consequent permanent injuries to the left hip 
and leg (and was a but-for cause of all this happening earlier than it 
otherwise would have), just as stabbing a person who more likely 
than not already has been stabbed sufficient times to bleed to death, 
but who still has a significant amount of blood left and several hours 
to live, contributes to that person’s bleeding to death (and is a but-for 
cause of the death happening earlier than it otherwise would have).100 
 
 97. See id. at 779 (Lord Bridge of Harwich), 784–85 (Lord Mackay of Clashfern), 791–92 
(Lord Ackner). 
 98. Id. at 782 (Lord Bridge of Harwich), 785, 789–90 (Lord Mackay of Clashfern), 792 
(Lord Ackner). 
 99. Id. at 785 (Lord Mackay of Clashfern) (quoting Mallett v. McMonagle, [1970] A.C. 166, 
176 (H.L.) (appeal taken from N. Ir.) (U.K.) (Lord Diplock)); accord, Hotson, 1 [1987] A.C. at 
792 (Lord Ackner). 
 100. See Wright, Legal Responsibility, supra note 6, at 1443–44; supra text accompanying 
notes 30–32.  Stephen Perry notes the physical consequences of the delay in treatment, but, like 
the House of Lords, he focuses on but-for causation and the “balance of probabilities” and thus 
fails to note the physical consequences’ causal contribution to the permanent injuries.  See Perry, 
supra note 4, at 252–61.  As Jane Stapleton notes in Occam’s Razor Reveals an Orthodox Basis 
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The defendant health authority might still have been able to 
escape liability through the “no worse off” limitation on attributable 
responsibility, if the permanent injury would have occurred anyway 
as the result of the non-liability-generating condition of the ruptured 
blood vessels caused by the plaintiff’s fall from the tree.  But now 
the shoe is on the other foot when considering the probabilities.  
Once the plaintiff has established that the defendant’s negligence 
caused (contributed to) his injury, as should have been found in 
Hotson, the courts generally will not—and should not—let the 
defendant escape liability for the injury that it negligently caused 
unless the defendant proves that it is nearly certain (or at least “clear 
and convincing”) that the injury would have occurred anyway: any 
uncertainty should be resolved in favor of the wronged plaintiff 
rather than in favor of the wrongdoer.101  The 75 percent probability 
that the permanent injury would have occurred anyway is, I believe, 
not sufficient to justify letting the defendant health authority off the 
hook for the injury that it negligently caused. 
V.  MARKET SHARE LIABILITY 
Although the courts generally have required that all the possible 
tortfeasors be joined as defendants in order for the alternative 
causation doctrine as applied in Summers to be applicable,102 they 
have not imposed that requirement in the very similar cases 
involving theoretically separable but practically inseparable 
injuries,103 nor is such a requirement stated in Summers or the 
Restatement (Second).  In fact, as the Sindell court noted,104 the 
Restatement (Second) explicitly leaves open the possibility of 
applying the doctrine when all the possible tortfeasors are not joined 
 
for Chester v. Afshar, 122 LAW Q. REV. 426, 429–30, 437 (2006), the Law Lords refused to 
follow the logic of either the but-for test or the “balance of probabilities” standard of proof in 
Chester v. Afshar, [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).  The 
various speeches in Chester confuse loss with risk, causation of loss with increasing risk, and 
causation of loss with issues of attributable responsibility (“proximate” causation). 
 101. See Wright, Legal Responsibility, supra note 6, at 1434–67; supra text accompanying 
note 40. 
 102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. g 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. c (1965); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. d(1) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 104. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 931 n.16, 936 (Cal. 1980). 
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as defendants.105  Under the interactive justice rationale for the 
alternative causation doctrine, the critical point (in addition to the 
inherent impossibility of resolving the causation issue) is that the 
plaintiff must prove that he was wronged and that the defendant is a 
person whose tortious conduct may have caused that wrong.  This 
requires only that the plaintiff prove that all the possible alternative 
causes of the injury were tortious, not that the plaintiff join them all 
in his lawsuit and bring them all before the court. 
The courts in Sindell and Hymowitz, confronted with cases in 
which there were hundreds of manufacturers who might have 
manufactured the diethylstilbestrol (DES) drug that caused the 
plaintiff’s cancer, not all of whom could be joined as defendants, 
applied an “extended” and modified version of Summers’s alternative 
causation doctrine, which imposes proportionate several liability 
based on the joined defendants’ respective shares of the market for 
the injurious product.  They were unwilling to impose full joint and 
several liability as in Summers for two related reasons.  First, the 
large number of possible tortfeasors greatly increases the number of 
defendants who would be held liable who did not contribute to the 
specific injury and correspondingly lowers the probability that any 
particular one of them wrongfully caused that injury, thereby 
rendering increasingly tenuous the justice argument for imposing full 
liability on each defendant.  Second, the large number of wronged 
plaintiffs means that each defendant would be held fully liable for a 
total number of injuries—all those caused by the injurious product—
that is much greater than the number that could possibly have been 
caused by its tortious conduct.106 
The market share proportional liability scheme adopted in 
Sindell and Hymowitz addresses both of these concerns.  As the 
Sindell court explained, in a statement that the Hymowitz court later 
 
 105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. h (1965); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“[I]t 
would be reasonable to excuse the plaintiff from this joinder requirement when an immunity or 
lack of jurisdiction prevents the joinder.”). 
 106. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 928, 931, 936–38; Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 
1074, 1076, 1078 & n.3 (N.Y. 1989).  But see Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 383 (Wash. 
1984) (holding liable defendants unable to prove their actual market share liable, pro rata, for the 
balance of the market); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 50–53 (Wis. 1984) (apportioning 
liability for the entire market among the liable defendants using comparative negligence 
principles); Hondius, supra note 1, at 410–11, 412 (discussing the Hoge Raad’s imposition of full 
joint and several liability on the defendant DES manufacturers). 
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correctly described as the “central justification” for Sindell’s market 
share approach,107 the defendants’ arguments that imposing any 
liability would be “unfair and contrary to public policy” were “based 
upon the assumption that one manufacturer would be held 
responsible for the products of another or for those of all other 
manufacturers if plaintiff ultimately prevails.  But under the rule we 
adopt, each manufacturer’s liability for an injury would be 
approximately equivalent to the damages caused by the DES it 
manufactured.”108  That is, one would expect that the percentage of 
the total DES plaintiffs who were actually injured by each 
defendant’s marketing of the generically identical formulations of 
DES is approximately the same as that defendant’s share of the total 
DES market, so holding each defendant liable in each case for a 
share of the damages in that case equal to its market share is roughly 
the same as what the defendant would and should be liable for if the 
plaintiffs that actually were injured by its DES could be identified. 
Viewed in this light, the market share version of the alternative 
causation doctrine results in the least departure from the causation 
requirement, rather than being the most radical departure, as is often 
claimed.  The wrongfully acting defendant has much less reason to 
complain under the market share version than it would under the full 
(joint and several) liability version as applied in Summers.  Not only 
is the liability reduced from full liability to partial liability (based on 
the defendant’s share of the relevant market), but also, given the 
large number of cases, each defendant’s aggregate liability will 
roughly equal the share of the total damages that it actually caused, 
rather than having all but one defendant held liable although they did 
not cause any injury, as occurs in single incident situations like 
Summers. 
Sindell requires the plaintiff to join as defendants the 
manufacturers of a “substantial share” of the market,109 but neither 
the Hymowitz court nor any other court that has adopted some form 
of the market share theory has required this.110  Contrary to what is 
 
 107. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1076. 
 108. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 938; see id. at 937. 
 109. Id. at 937. 
 110. See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1076–78.  Two of the better known cases, in addition to 
Hymowitz, are the Martin and Collins cases cited supra note 106. 
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sometimes assumed,111 and as the Sindell court seems to have 
intended with its requirement that the plaintiff join a “substantial 
share” of the market,112 the point is not—or should not be—to assure 
a high or substantial probability that liability will be imposed on and 
damages paid by the DES manufacturer whose tortious conduct 
actually caused the injury.  That entity still may not be one of the 
joined defendants, and, even if it is, it will at best pay only a portion 
of the damages and may well pay none if it is insolvent or has such a 
small share of the market that it would be too costly for the plaintiff 
to try to collect from it.  Rather, as Sindell emphasizes, the point is to 
have each defendant pay (roughly) for its share of the total DES-
related injuries, by paying a share of each injury equal to its share of 
the relevant DES market,113 and there is no need to require joinder of 
any other possible tortfeasors in order to accomplish this objective 
for any particular defendant. 
The correlation between the damages the defendant actually 
caused and the damages for which the defendant is held liable will be 
greatest under the market share scheme adopted in the Hymowitz 
case.  Nevertheless, some courts and interactive justice scholars find 
Hymowitz to be the most radical and objectionable tort case, since it 
holds a defendant liable in proportion to her market share even when 
the defendant can prove that it was not the cause of the particular 
plaintiff’s injury.114  As the Hymowitz court explains, allowing such 
exculpation would detract from the overall objective of the market 
share scheme, which does not seek to hold a defendant liable for the 
particular injuries that it caused, which generally is impossible to do 
in this context, but rather to hold it liable to the extent feasible for the 
share of the total damages that it actually caused.  If the defendant 
were allowed to exculpate itself, it would pay zero damages in those 
cases while paying only its market share in other cases, resulting 
 
 111. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. g 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 112. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936–37. 
 113. Id. at 937–38. 
 114. See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 334 (Ill. 1990); WEINRIB, supra note 
4, at 154–55 & n.20; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 1413–14, 1416 n.16; Ripstein & 
Zipursky, supra note 6, at 215–16, 228, 238. 
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overall in underpayment for the share of the total damages that it 
actually caused.115 
It may seem that the Hymowitz court is inconsistent with respect 
to this overall objective, since it allows a plaintiff to obtain full 
damages from a defendant if the plaintiff can prove that the 
defendant caused her particular injury.116  However, it clearly would 
be an injustice to the individual plaintiff to require that her fully 
proven, “first-best” interactive justice claim must be sacrificed to the 
“second-best” market share interactive justice scheme.  The 
imbalance introduced into the market share scheme by holding the 
defendant fully liable to such a plaintiff can be reduced by allowing 
the defendant to bring a contribution action against the other 
participants in the market to obtain reimbursement from them for 
their share of the plaintiff’s damages.117 
The courts that have rejected market share liability generally 
have done so for practical reasons, including administrative 
complexities and the difficulty of establishing actual market shares, 
especially when the products put into the market by different 
defendants are not fungible or create different amounts of risk.  The 
trial court in Sindell ultimately found it necessary and feasible to use 
a national market, as did the Hymowitz court.118  Some courts, in 
addition to citing the practical problems, have also asserted that 
market share liability is too radical a departure from established tort 
principles, in particular the causation requirement,119 but these 
assertions ring hollow.  Market share liability more closely 
conditions defendants’ liability on their tortious causation of wrongs 
 
 115. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078 & n.3.  Although the court stated that, given its adoption 
of a national market for the purpose of calculating market shares, its market share theory could 
not be “founded upon the belief that, over the run of cases, liability will approximate causation in 
this State,” id. at 1078 (emphasis added), and that it was apportioning liability “so as to 
correspond to the over-all culpability of each defendant, measured by the amount of risk of injury 
each defendant created to the public-at-large,” id., its use of national market shares to measure 
that risk and culpability and its disallowance of exculpation clearly were intended to have each 
defendant’s liability approximate, as closely as possible, the share of the total DES damages 
actually caused nationally by that defendant, with respect to the portion of those damages for 
which claims were brought in the New York courts.  See id. at 1077 (noting that many of the New 
York claims undoubtedly involved DES ingested in another state). 
 116. Id. at 1073. 
 117. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 345, 349 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 118. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1076–77; see Aaron D. Twerski, Market Share–A Tale of Two 
Centuries, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 869, 870 & n.5 (1989). 
 119. See, e.g., Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 328–29, 334–36, 345. 
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than do many other doctrines—the Summers alternative causation 
doctrine, the “doubling+” doctrine in the toxic tort cases, the medical 
lost chance doctrine, and especially the res ipsa loquitur doctrine 
(discussed in Part VI below)—that are accepted by many courts, 
including those courts that object to the market share doctrine.120 
It is true that a tension with the interactive justice principle is 
created by Hymowitz’s disallowance of exculpation by a defendant 
who can prove that it did not cause the plaintiff’s injury and, 
similarly, by the suggested allowance of contribution actions by an 
inculpated defendant against defendants known not to have caused 
the plaintiff’s injury.  Interactive justice claims assert that a wrong 
(possibly) has been or is about to be inflicted on the plaintiff by the 
defendant.  While Hymowitz does not sacrifice a plaintiff’s first-best 
interactive justice claim to the second-best market share liability 
regime, it does, by holding liable a defendant who did not wrong—or 
even possibly wrong—the plaintiff, seem to hold the defendant liable 
without any interactive or distributive justice justification and thus to 
create an interactive justice wrong to the defendant.121  Yet, unlike 
the “fault pools” promoted by Jules Coleman and others, the 
defendant is not being held liable for mere imposition of risk in the 
absence of causation of any injury or in the absence of any other 
(e.g., distributive justice) justification.122  Rather, the defendant is 
being held liable for the damages that it wrongfully caused in the 
 
 120. For the Supreme Court of Illinois’s unsuccessful attempt to explain why market share 
liability is a radical departure from fundamental tort principles, but Summers’s alternative 
causation doctrine and the res ipsa loquitur doctrine—both of which it accepts—are not, see id. at 
339–40.  The court subsequently adopted, while claiming not to have done so, the “relaxed 
causation” version of the medical lost chance doctrine.  Holton v. Mem’l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 
1202, 1209–13 (Ill. 1997).  It noted that it had not been asked to adopt the “risk exposure as 
injury” liability doctrine.  Id. at 1210 n.1. 
 121. See Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, supra note 6, at 178–80; Richard W. Wright, 
Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 702–05 (1992). 
 122. Coleman’s advocacy of fault pools and no-fault systems is described and criticized in 
Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, supra note 6, at 176–80; Wright, Substantive Corrective 
Justice, supra note 121, at 665–83, 704–05; see also COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 401–06.  He 
claims that Sindell and Hymowitz neither implement nor conflict with interactive justice, but 
rather set up a “localized at-fault pool” that, in Hymowitz, displaces interactive justice claims.  Id. 
at 405–06.  This is wrong.  As is discussed in the text, Sindell and (arguably) Hymowitz set up 
second-best interactive justice liability regimes, which, moreover, do not displace first-best 
interactive justice claims.  Coleman erroneously states that I interpret and defend Hymowitz as 
imposing liability for the wrongful imposition of risk.  Id. at 399–400.  In my only previous 
discussion of the Hymowitz case, I briefly defended it on the grounds that are elaborated here.  
See Wright, Once More, supra note 8, at 1118 & n.163. 
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aggregate, and this is most true under Hymowitz’s liability regime.  
Thus, although there undoubtedly is a tension with first-best 
interactive justice, I believe Hymowitz’s liability regime can be 
defended as a proper second-best interactive justice solution in the 
special context of situations like the DES cases. 
Geistfeld only attempts to explain and justify Sindell’s market 
share liability rule—again through his evidential grouping principle 
rather than any interactive justice or efficiency argument.  He relies 
on the 50+ percent statistical probability interpretation of the 
preponderance standard and Sindell’s requirement that plaintiffs join 
as defendants DES manufacturers representing a “substantial share” 
of the DES market, which he implicitly assumes must be more than 
50 percent (or else his argument will not work).  He also relies on the 
legal fiction that was relied on by the British House of Lords in 
Hotson—that anything that is proved to be more probable than not is, 
under the statistical probability interpretation of the preponderance 
standard, treated as certain.  He argues that, since it is more likely 
than not that an evidential group composed of defendants that 
supplied more than half of the DES market contains the manufacturer 
whose DES drug actually caused the plaintiff’s injury, application of 
the preponderance standard interpreted as a statistical probability 
“proves” that this group—or, to the same effect, one of its members, 
each of whom may have caused the injury—caused the plaintiff’s 
injury, and, conversely, that none of those outside the group caused 
the plaintiff’s injury.  Therefore his evidential grouping principle 
(which, unlike the Restatement (Second), requires that all possible 
tortfeasors be joined as defendants) is satisfied, and the alternative 
causation doctrine applies to the members of the group.123 
Although it is not entirely clear, given Geistfeld’s confusing 
(and perhaps confused) discussions of joint and several liability, he 
apparently recognizes that, under the alternative causation doctrine 
and his evidential grouping principle, each defendant in the group is 
jointly and severally liable for the entirety of the plaintiff’s damages 
(unless the defendant proves that she did not cause the plaintiff’s 
injury), but he assumes that each defendant would ultimately pay 
only a fractional share of the total damages as a result of contribution 
actions among the defendants.  The fractional share would be based 
 
 123. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 478–79, 481–82 & n.93. 
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on each defendant’s proportionate contribution to the overall risk 
created by the evidential group, for which the defendant’s share of 
the (group’s) market is a sufficient proxy when the product in 
question is fungible and risk exposure occurs identically through 
each instance of consumption of the product, as was assumed to be 
true for the DES drug.124 
However, this extension of Summers would result in each 
defendant’s being held liable for more than her proportionate share 
of the damages, even after contribution by the other defendants, 
considering the risks created by all the possible tortfeasors, including 
those not included in the smaller group.  This result, Geistfeld 
asserts, would be unfair, although nothing in his evidential grouping 
principle explains why it would be unfair.  He argues that, to avoid 
this unfair excessive liability, each defendant’s liability should be 
limited in proportion to the probability that she actually caused the 
injury.125  But then the plaintiff would not receive, in the aggregate, 
100 percent of her damages, as is intended under the alternative 
causation doctrine.  This problem, Geistfeld states, explains why the 
courts require that all possible tortfeasors be joined as defendants and 
brought before the court: to ensure that the plaintiff receives 100 
percent compensation without imposing excessive liability on any 
defendant.  However, if all the possible tortfeasors must be joined the 
plaintiff will receive nothing when this is not possible.  To enable the 
plaintiff to obtain some recovery from the defendants who are 
brought before the court, without imposing excessive liability on any 
defendant, Geistfeld argues that the alternative causation doctrine 
and his evidential grouping principle must be modified in this 
context (when all tortfeasors cannot be joined) by limiting each 
defendant’s liability to a share of the plaintiff’s damages equal to the 
defendant’s proportionate contribution to the risk created by all the 
possible tortfeasors—which is Sindell’s liability rule.126 
As Geistfeld acknowledges, his argument does not explain 
Hymowitz or any of the other market share liability cases other than 
Sindell,127 which unlike Sindell do not require joinder as defendants 
of manufacturers representing a “substantial share” of the market.  
 
 124. Id. at 480, 482, 490–92 & n.122. 
 125. Id. at 480–83, 492. 
 126. Id. at 480–83. 
 127. Id. at 483–84. 
  
1332 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1295 
Nor does his argument even explain Sindell if the required 
“substantial share” in Sindell is less than or equal to 50 percent.  If 
the evidential group of joined defendants does not represent more 
than half of the market, it cannot be “proven,” through use of the 
statistical probability interpretation of the preponderance standard, 
that (one of the members of) the evidential group caused the 
plaintiff’s injury. 
Moreover, Geistfeld’s argument has an internal inconsistency 
that invalidates it as an explanation of Sindell, even with a required 
joinder of defendants representing more than half of the market.  The 
assumption of excessive liability that supposedly justifies shifting 
from joint and several liability to proportionate several liability based 
on actual market shares contradicts his argument that it has been 
proven (by a statistical probability) that all the possible tortfeasors 
are members of the smaller (“substantial share” of the market) group.  
Given that “proof,” there is no excessive liability when the full 
liability is divided up among the members of the smaller group, 
either initially or through contribution actions.  Bringing those 
excluded from the smaller group back into the picture in order to 
argue that there is excessive liability for those in the smaller group, 
based on proportionate risk contribution calculated in terms of the 
initial larger group, is contrary to and undermines the purported 
“proof” that the smaller group contains all the possible tortfeasors.128 
As with the basic alternative causation doctrine in Summers, 
taking the statistical probability interpretation of the preponderance 
standard seriously leads to a reductio ad absurdum when it is applied 
to the DES cases.  Geistfeld’s argument, which depends on the 
statistical probability interpretation, can be applied repeatedly to 
carve successively smaller groups out of the original group of 
 
 128. Geistfeld’s argument also fails to explain why all the possible tortfeasors must be joined 
as defendants.  He claims that this is necessary for the plaintiff to be able to recover 100 percent 
of her damages.  Id. at 481.  However, under Summers’s alternative causation doctrine, each 
defendant who is unable to prove lack of causation is jointly and severally liable for the entirety 
of the plaintiff’s damages.  Summers v. Tice, 199 P. 2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948).  The plaintiff will be 
unable to recover all of her damages only if the doctrine is changed so that each defendant’s 
liability initially is only proportionate several liability rather than joint and several liability, and 
even then only if one or more defendants in the group is unavailable or insolvent, since, as 
explained in the text, the proportionate shares of the members of the smaller group should add up 
to 100 percent.  In any event, it is odd to argue, as Geistfeld does, that the plaintiff’s inability to 
recover all of her damages under the proportionate several liability approach explains the 
requirement that all the possible tortfeasors be joined, which results in the plaintiff’s receiving 
zero damages given the initial assumption that all the possible tortfeasors cannot be joined. 
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possible tortfeasors, by “proving” at each step that the increasingly 
smaller group contains all the possible tortfeasors, one of whom 
caused the plaintiff’s injury, until we are down to a single defendant 
who is “proved” to have caused the plaintiff’s injury and thus is fully 
liable for that injury.  His argument, taken to its logical conclusion, 
would support liability not only when the plaintiff joins as 
defendants DES manufacturers representing at least half of the 
market, as he assumes is required in Sindell, but also liability without 
such a joinder requirement—as in Hymowitz and the other cases that 
have approved some form of market share liability—but it would go 
much further than Sindell and Hymowitz in supporting full (joint and 
several) liability rather than proportionate several liability. 
Another consequence of taking the statistical probability 
interpretation of the preponderance standard seriously is that a single 
defendant who had more than 50 percent of the market—for 
example, 55 percent—should be held liable as a matter of law for 
each of the injuries caused by the product at issue, even though it 
could have caused only around 55 percent of the total injuries.  The 
plaintiff in Sindell alleged that Eli Lilly and five or six other 
companies produced 90 percent of the marketed DES,129 and it has 
been stated that Eli Lilly may well have supplied, directly or 
indirectly, more than half of the marketed DES.130  It thus is worth 
noting how carefully the Sindell court phrased its statements on proof 
of causation of the plaintiff’s injury.  The court observed that an 
inference of causation based on statistical probability would fail “if 
we measure the chance that any one of the defendants supplied the 
injury-causing drug by the number of possible tortfeasors,”131 rather 
than by the defendant’s market share.  It seems fairly clear that, even 
if Eli Lilly was involved in production of more than half of the 
marketed DES, no court would or should hold Eli Lilly fully liable 
for each (and thus every) DES injury, although such a result would 
be mandated under the statistical probability interpretation of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. 
 
 129. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980). 
 130. See Aaron M. Levine, “Gilding the Lilly”: A DES Update, 20 TRIAL, Dec. 1984, at 18, 
19–20. 
 131. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 931 (emphasis added); see id. at 936–37. 
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As far as I know, only one court, the Supreme Court of Oregon 
in Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,132 has even suggested 
such a possibility.  The Senn court, noting that one defendant had 
supplied 73 percent of the DPT vaccine in the state and the other 
defendant had supplied the other 23 percent, stated that, because 
neither party had raised the issue, “we do not now consider whether 
proof that a particular manufacturer’s share of the relevant market is 
greater than 50 percent satisfies the preponderance of evidence 
standard on the issue of causation” and then cited articles referring to 
the “naked statistics” issue.133  The answer should be yes, as a matter 
of law, if the court took literally and seriously what it described 
elsewhere in the opinion as the “traditional 50+ percent (‘more 
probable than not’) preponderance of evidence standard.”134  
Ironically, the court rejected the alternative causation doctrine 
(becoming one of the very few courts to do so) even though there 
were only two possible tortfeasors, each of whom was joined as a 
defendant, because of “the violence it does to the causation-in-fact 
element of tort law,”135 while mentioning as possibly plausible using 
the naked 73 percent statistic to “prove” causation by one of the 
defendants, which would result in much greater violence being done 
to the causation requirement and just principles of liability, 
especially if there were numerous plaintiffs, to each of whom the 
defendant would be fully liable. 
VI.  RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
Geistfeld proposes a different version of evidential grouping to 
explain and justify the liability result in Ybarra v. Spangard.136  In 
Ybarra, an unconscious patient suffered a traumatic injury during or 
after an operation, which had to have been caused by one or more of 
the attending doctors or nurses, only some of whom were employees 
of the hospital.137  The court, noting that the plaintiff obviously was 
unable to identify the person(s) who injured him “unless the doctors 
and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose the identity of 
 
 132. 751 P.2d 215 (Or. 1988). 
 133. Id. at 216 n.1. 
 134. Id. at 222. 
 135. Id.; see supra note 64. 
 136. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944). 
 137. Id. at 688, 690. 
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the negligent person and the facts establishing liability,” stated that 
“‘the particular force and justice of the [res ipsa loquitur doctrine], 
regarded as a presumption throwing upon the party charged the duty 
of producing evidence, consists in the circumstance that the chief 
evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is 
practically accessible to him but inaccessible to the injured 
person.’”138  The court employed an expanded version of the doctrine 
to create a rebuttable presumption of negligent causation of the 
injury by each of the doctors and nurses, who thus were each jointly 
and severally liable, except for those who proved (through specific 
evidence rather than a mere statistical probability) that they did not 
negligently contribute to the injury.139 
Geistfeld’s normal evidential grouping argument will not work 
to justify the joint and several liability in Ybarra, since there was no 
specific evidence of negligence by any of the defendants and not all 
of the attending nurses were joined as defendants.140  He instead 
argues that, “[s]ince the defendants acted together as a group in 
providing surgical treatment to the plaintiff, and since the nature of 
their conduct made it impossible for the plaintiff to identify the 
individual tortfeasor, the defendants’ conduct provided a sufficient 
reason to group them for evidentiary purposes.”141  This is a weak 
and extremely overbroad rationale for imposing joint and several 
liability on each of the defendants in the absence of any specific 
proof of negligence or causation, especially with respect to the joined 
nurses who likely had no knowledge of what occurred and no way of 
finding out.142 
Ybarra has been heavily criticized and rarely followed.143  By 
creating an en masse rebuttable presumption of negligence and 
causation by each doctor and nurse, it is a radical extension of the 
usual res ipsa loquitur doctrine in the United States, which only 
 
 138. Id. at 689 (quoting 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2309, at 382 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 139. Id. at 690–91. 
 140. See id. at 688. 
 141. Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 473. 
 142. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44.  Geistfeld sets aside the Ybarra court’s focus 
on the “conspiracy of silence” in medical practice and the court’s assumption that someone 
among the defendants must have known what happened, since those factors did not exist in 
Summers and he is seeking to analogize Ybarra to Summers.  Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 473. 
 143. PORAT & STEIN, supra note 43, at 68–69; see DOBBS, supra note 77, § 249. 
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permits (rather than requires) an inference of negligence and 
causation, only permits such an inference against individual 
defendants, and only permits the inference if certain conditions are 
met, which are usually stated as follows: 
It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is 
caused by negligence of the defendant when 
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in 
the absence of negligence; 
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the 
plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the 
evidence; and 
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the 
defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.144 
Ybarra dispenses with condition (b), which requires that the 
negligence inferred through satisfaction of condition (a) be 
attributable to the particular defendant.145 
Although it is not generally recognized, even with condition (b) 
intact, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, as commonly stated, constitutes 
a major departure from not only the individualized proof of causation 
requirement, but also, even more significantly, the requirement that 
the plaintiff prove that the particular defendant was negligent.  
Interpreted literally, condition (a) in the Restatement (Second) 
formulation allows an inference of negligent conduct, which is 
subsequently attributed to the defendant through satisfaction of 
condition (b), based on a mere ex ante statistical frequency.  If, in the 
aggregate, most (50+ percent) occurrences of this type of event are 
caused by negligence, then negligent causation by someone can be 
inferred without any specific evidence of negligence by the 
defendant or anyone else on the particular occasion, and that 
 
 144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D(1) (1965).  As David Kaye has pointed out, 
the phrasing of condition (a) is ambiguous, and it is an improper basis for even a statistically 
based inference of negligence if it is interpreted literally.  David Kaye, Probability Theory Meets 
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1461–64 (1979).  The problem is not—as Kaye 
assumes—with the phrase “ordinarily does not occur,” see id., but rather with the phrase “in the 
absence of.”  If “in the absence of negligence” means “if there is no negligence,” condition (a) 
merely says that accidents of this type do not usually occur when there is no negligence, which 
does not support an inference that, when an accident does occur, it usually is due to negligence.  
“In the absence of negligence” should be replaced with “unless there is negligence.” 
 145. 154 P. 2d at 690. 
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negligence can then be attributed to the defendant through 
satisfaction of condition (b). 
Thus, contrary to what is commonly stated,146 it is not true that 
res ipsa loquitur is merely a fancy Latin name, employed in the 
particular context of proving the defendant’s causal negligence, for 
the ordinary use of circumstantial evidence to make a straightforward 
factual inference.  Circumstantial evidence is concrete evidence 
specific to the particular occasion about the network of instantiated 
causal relationships leading to and flowing from the particular 
factual issue being litigated.  For example, a person’s running away 
from the scene of a murder immediately after it happened with blood 
on her that matches the victim’s blood and holding a knife, the blade 
of which matches the victim’s stab wound, is strong circumstantial 
evidence that she stabbed the victim.  The inference of negligence 
allowed by the res ipsa loquitur doctrine as stated by the Restatement 
(Second) and many courts, interpreted literally, does not require any 
such case-specific evidence of what actually happened on the 
particular occasion, but rather only abstract statistical data (or 
assumptions) on what usually (50+ percent of the time) has happened 
in such situations. 
An inference of negligence on the particular occasion based 
merely on abstract aggregate statistics is valid if the sort of accident 
that occurred never (or almost never?) happens unless there is 
negligence.  Such proof is required if the word “ordinarily” is left out 
of condition (a) in the Restatement (Second) formulation, so that the 
plaintiff must prove that the event is of a kind that does not, or could 
not, or would not happen unless there is negligence.  This is how the 
situation was described in the case that gave birth to the phrase and 
how the requirement is still described by some courts.147  If the 
plaintiff offers such proof, then it is a straightforward and necessary 
 
 146. E.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, § 39, at 243–44 & n.20; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a (1965).  But see DOBBS, supra note 77, § 154, at 372 (noting, 
correctly, that res ipsa loquitur cases differ “overwhelmingly” from ordinary circumstantial 
evidence cases by allowing an inference of negligence without any particularistic evidence of 
negligence on the particular occasion). 
 147. McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[I]n the absence 
of negligence, the accident would not have occurred . . . .”); Kolakowski v. Voris, 415 N.E.2d 
397, 400 (Ill. 1980) (“For plaintiff to take advantage of this inference, he must show that he was 
injured (1) in an occurrence which would not have occurred in the absence of negligence . . . .”); 
Byrne v. Boadle, [1803] 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 301 (Exch. Div.) (“A barrel could not roll out of a 
warehouse without some negligence.”). 
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factual inference that someone must have been negligent.  But if the 
word “ordinarily” is included, as it usually is, and “ordinarily” is 
interpreted as mere statistical frequency, as it usually is (at least by 
academics), then the defendant is being found negligent in the 
absence of any evidence that the defendant (or anyone else) was 
negligent on the particular occasion, merely because in most 
situations like this there is negligence (by someone).  The difference 
in the validity of the inference depending on whether or not the word 
“ordinarily” is included parallels the distinction between the 
admissibility of habit evidence (allowed) and character evidence 
(generally not allowed) to prove what a person did on a particular 
occasion.148 
The inference of negligence may also be valid under those 
formulations of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine that allow the inference 
if the accident is of a kind that “in the normal or ordinary course of 
events would not happen” unless there is negligence.149  This 
phrasing is not equivalent to the “ordinarily would not happen” 
phrasing.  The latter phrasing directly invites resort to mere statistical 
frequency, whereas the former suggests a focus on the physical 
sequence of events on the particular occasion or, at the least, does not 
immediately focus thought on mere statistical frequency.150 
Although some view the “sufficient elimination” issue in 
condition (b) of the Restatement (Second) formulation as also being a 
mere 50+ percent statistical probability issue, it is usually not 
 
 148. E.g., 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 186, 188, 195 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th 
ed. 2006). 
 149. See, e.g., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 69, § 22.01 (stating that 
the plaintiff must prove that “in the normal course of events, the [injury] [damage] would not 
have occurred if the defendant had used ordinary care”); Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks 
Co., [1865] 159 Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (Exch. Div.) (“[W]here the thing is shewn to be under the 
management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of 
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable 
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of 
care.”). 
 150. There is a common failure to appreciate the possibly significant difference between the 
two phrasings.  Consider the following passage: 
The requirement that the occurrence be one which ordinarily does not happen without 
negligence is of course only another way of stating an obvious principle of 
circumstantial evidence: that the event must be such that in the light of ordinary 
experience it gives rise to an inference that someone must have been negligent. 
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, § 39, at 244 (emphasis added); see DOBBS, supra note 77, § 
154, at 371 & n.5.  There is a significant difference between “must have been negligent” and 
“probably was negligent.” 
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interpreted or treated that way in practice.  Rather, the courts require 
that other possible sources of the causal negligence (inferred through 
satisfaction of condition (a)) be eliminated through evidence specific 
to the particular occasion that is sufficient to create a minimal belief 
that it must have been the defendant, rather than someone else, who 
was the negligent cause of the accident.  The comments to 
Restatement (Second) § 328D(1)(b), while making a few references 
to mere probability, reflect this practice, while noting that there need 
not be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  The comments focus on the 
often mentioned “exclusive management or control of the defendant” 
and “no voluntary action or contribution by the plaintiff” 
requirements,151 which, although overly strict if interpreted literally, 
are specific attempts to make sure that the inferred causal negligence 
actually was that of the particular defendant.152 
The Restatement (Third), on the other hand, not only treats both 
conditions as mere statistical probability issues but assumes, 
erroneously, that they are stochastically independent issues that 
should be multiplied together to obtain an overall probability of the 
defendant’s being the negligent cause of the event.153  It thus 
collapses the conditions for drawing the res ipsa loquitur inference 
into a single statistical probability assessment: 
The factfinder may infer that the defendant has been 
negligent [and that the negligence caused the accident] 
when the accident causing the plaintiff’s physical harm is a 
type of accident that ordinarily happens as a result of the 
negligence of a class of actors of which the defendant is the 
relevant member.154 
 
 151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmts. f, g, i (1965). 
 152. See id.; PORAT & STEIN, supra note 43, at 84, 87, 91–92; PROSSER & KEETON, supra 
note 35, § 39, at 244, 249–50, 254; sources cited supra note 149. 
 153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 17 cmt. a 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 154. Id. § 17.  But see id. §17 cmt. d: 
Evidence about other possible causes.  In many situations, neither common knowledge 
nor expert testimony may be available to support the idea that the type of accident 
ordinarily happens because of the negligence of the defendant.  In such situations, res 
ipsa loquitur can be found applicable only if the plaintiff has offered evidence tending 
to negate the presence of causes other than the defendant’s negligence.  That is, if the 
type of accident is sometimes caused by the defendant’s negligence but is more 
frequently brought about by other causes that are unrelated to the defendant’s 
negligence, res ipsa loquitur can be found applicable only once the plaintiff has 
presented evidence tending to negate the presence of those other causes. 
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The issues addressed by the two conditions in the Restatement 
(Second) formulation (and by the two or more conditions in the 
courts’ formulations) are distinct liability requirements.  As with the 
distinct elements that make up a complete cause of action, courts 
should and do require that they be individually appraised and proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  They are not subject to the 
combinatory algorithms of mathematical probability theory, which 
are valid for ex ante statistical probability assessments of what might 
happen but not for ex post case-specific assessments of what actually 
happened.155 
The common failure to appreciate the extraordinary nature of the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine is probably attributable to an assumption 
that the word “ordinarily” in the first condition is simply an 
incorporation of the preponderance of the evidence standard, 
interpreted as merely requiring a 50+ percent statistical probability.  
Once again, however, taking this interpretation seriously 
immediately raises a logical contradiction.  Why, if the first 
condition is satisfied, is the inference that someone was negligent 
only a permissive one, rather than being required?  Why, in the 
absence of any contrary evidence by the defendant, allow the 
factfinder not to draw the inference once the conditions for drawing 
the inference have been established, especially since this permits 
inconsistent verdicts by different juries in similar situations, which is 
a denial of formal justice? 
The reason, I suspect, is a discomfort with the broad formulation 
of the doctrine, especially when there is a conscious realization that it 
permits an inference of negligence by the defendant based merely on 
aggregate statistical frequency.  Allowing the factfinder not to draw 
the inference may be an implicit concession that the factfinder should 
be able to draw the inference or not depending on whether the 
factfinder actually believes the defendant was causally negligent in 
the particular situation.  But if the existence of such an actual belief 
is the concern, the broad formulation should be abandoned in favor 
of the narrow one, or at least the factfinder should be instructed that 
an inference of negligent causation should be drawn only if evidence 
 
 155. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 49–120 (1977); Ronald 
J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion in Civil Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 895–904; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 2, at 1051–66; supra text 
accompanying notes 66–70. 
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specific to the particular case combines with the “ordinarily would 
not happen” statistical frequency to raise a minimal belief that the 
defendant actually was negligent in the particular situation and that 
such negligence contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.  On the other 
hand, if the broad formulation is meant to provide a second-best (or 
third-best) resolution of the factual uncertainty regarding negligent 
causation, it seems that decision should be consistently implemented 
through a rebuttable presumption. 
Ybarra extends liability much further than the ordinary res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine and also much further than Summers, Sindell, or 
Hymowitz, since it is not only unlikely that all or even most of the 
defendants contributed to the injury, but also unlikely that all or even 
many of them were negligent.  Jules Coleman argues that the Ybarra 
result can be justified under interactive justice as providing an 
incentive for those with knowledge of what actually happened to 
reveal that information, so that liability will fall properly and solely 
on the negligent wrongdoer(s).156  However, as he recognizes, the 
information may not be forthcoming.  Some of the defendants, 
especially the nurses, will have little or no ability to discover what 
happened if they were not themselves involved, and they will face 
considerable pressure to remain silent even if they do know. 
I have previously suggested that an enterprise liability theory 
would be justifiable in situations like Ybarra, although not as applied 
in Ybarra itself: 
The court itself mentioned that all the defendants could be 
treated as permanent or temporary employees of the 
supervising surgeon or the hospital.  When all the 
defendants are connected through contractual or 
commercial relationships into a common enterprise and can 
adjust the risks and liabilities among themselves, and 
persons injured by that enterprise ordinarily will have a 
difficult time pinpointing the tortious source of the injury, it 
may be appropriate to treat the defendants as a group 
entity–an enterprise–which tortiously caused the injury, and 
to let the members of the enterprise allocate the liability 
among themselves or absolve themselves, as they see fit.  
 
 156. COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 395–96, 492 n.2. 
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The other situations to which the Ybarra rationale has been 
applied all fit this analysis.157 
As I indicated in a footnote appended to the first sentence of the 
above quote, in Ybarra the liability should be limited to the 
supervising surgeon and/or the hospital (preferably the latter), since 
“the hospital and supervising surgeon can control and adjust the risks 
beforehand and obtain information afterward more easily than the 
nurses or orderlies can.”158  This indeed is the approach that has been 
taken in similar cases, rather than Ybarra’s imposition of liability en 
masse.159 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Geistfeld’s attempt to justify the alternative causation doctrine 
and to extend it to justify Sindell’s market share doctrine is valuable 
for bringing into clear view a logical inconsistency that arises when 
the alternative causation doctrine is applied to a situation involving 
more than two defendants and the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is interpreted as merely requiring a 50+ percent statistical 
probability.  However, rather than questioning the statistical 
probability interpretation, Geistfeld constructs various arguments, 
some of which rely on that interpretation, to try to get around the 
logical inconsistency that it generates.  As I have tried to 
demonstrate, these arguments generate further inconsistencies and 
implausible results, as do the arguments of others who accept—and 
often rely on—the statistical probability interpretation when 
criticizing one or more of the various tort doctrines that have arisen 
in an attempt to deal with situations involving irreducible uncertainty 
about causation.160  They do not realize that the statistical probability 
interpretation generates results that are much more of a departure 
from the causation requirement and a just system of tort liability than 
the results allowed by the doctrines that they criticize, or, relatedly, 
that doctrines that they do not question that are based on the 
 
 157. Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1821 (footnote omitted). 
 158. Id. at 1821 n.361. 
 159. See, e.g., Kolakowski v. Voris, 415 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ill. 1980); DOBBS, supra note 77, § 
249, at 652; PORAT & STEIN, supra note 43, at 69. 
 160. See, e.g., Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharm., Inc., 751 P.2d 215, 222–23 (Or. 1988) (discussed 
supra note 64 and text accompanying notes 132–135. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 
340–41 (Ill. 1990); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 1414–15; Ripstein & Zipursky, supra 
note 6, at 241–44. 
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statistical probability interpretation are much more problematic than 
the doctrines that they criticize. 
The statistical probability interpretation of the preponderance 
standard must be abandoned.  It must be replaced with the traditional 
understanding of the preponderance standard, which still generally 
prevails in practice: proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
requires the formation of a minimal belief, based on particularistic 
evidence specific to the particular occasion, that the disputed fact 
actually existed.  When the disputed fact is actual causation of injury, 
there must be a minimal belief that the causal law underlying the 
allegedly applicable causal generalization was fully instantiated on 
the particular occasion.  This understanding of the burden of 
persuasion in civil cases is required as a matter of interactive justice.  
When the burden of persuasion is understood in this way, both the 
Summers alternative causation doctrine and the market share doctrine 
adopted in Sindell and, arguably, in Hymowitz can be defended as 
second-best implementations of interactive justice, and the justice or 
injustice of other doctrines, such as various versions of the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine and liability for increased risks and lost chances, 
can be more clearly addressed. 
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